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1. Introduction 
The Uruguay Round Agreement, which led to the creation of the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), stipulates that the member countries launch a round of negotiations for trade liberalization 
in agriculture and services beginning January 1, 2000.  With that date approaching, WTO members 
are now seriously discussing the possibility of a “Millennium Round” of multilateral trade 
negotiations (MTNs).  The next WTO Ministerial, to be held in Seattle at the end of November 
1999, is likely to launch this round. 
Prior to the Uruguay Round (UR), developing countries had not participated actively in 
multilateral negotiations.  Virtually all liberalization commitments in the Kennedy and Tokyo 
Rounds were made by developed countries.  On the one hand, this fact gave developing countries a 
"free ride" since, under the Most Favored Nation (MFN) rule of the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT), a tariff reduction granted to one trading partner must be granted to all GATT 
members.  But, on the other hand, it encouraged developed countries to leave the sectors of greatest 
interest to developing countries out of the negotiations.  Indeed, they were able to protect textiles 
and clothing, the sector in which developing countries have the greatest export potential, via the 
abominable, GATT-sanctioned Multi-fibre Agreement (MFA).  The MFA was not only 
protectionist, it was entirely against the spirit of the GATT.  It allowed the United States, European 
Union and a few other developed countries to use quantitative restrictions, which effectively violated Article XI; through country-specific quotas, it also introduced discrimination across trading 
partners, thus, effectively violating Article I.   
All this changed in the Uruguay Round, however.  Developing countries participated 
actively in this MTN, accepting the GATT tariff bindings on a large scale for the first time.   
Whereas they had generally refrained from signing various plurilateral agreements negotiated by 
developed countries during the Tokyo Round, they signed the UR Agreement in its entirety.  This 
even included the Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs) that, taken by 
itself, was detrimental to their interests but was, nevertheless, a necessary cost of obtaining 
concessions in other areas, most notably, the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, which promises 
to dismantle the highly distortionary MFA regime. 
  With the Seattle Ministerial meting approaching, developing countries must consider 
possible strategies to maximize benefits from the negotiating round that this meeting is likely to 
launch.  In the present paper, I make a modest attempt to address this ambitious subject.  I discuss 
issues of overall strategy in the short and long run as also specific questions in the key areas that are 
on the table currently. 
From the viewpoint of overall strategy (Section 2), I argue that developing countries should 
limit the agenda for the forthcoming round to the built-in UR agenda plus trade liberalization in 
industrial goods.  In other areas, developing countries need to conduct their own careful studies 
before agreeing to negotiate.  By engaging in wider negotiations, they also risk spreading their 
limited negotiating capacity thinly.  Most importantly, a prima-facie case that they are likely to 
benefit from negotiations in other areas has simply not been made.  From a long-run perspective, I 
argue strongly that developing countries need to commit substantial human and financial resources 
to create native research and negotiating capacity on WTO related issues.  The experience of UR 
  2 negotiations teaches that stakes in this game are too high to let negotiations move forward by 
default. 
Among specific areas of negotiation, I discuss trade liberalization in industry, agriculture 
and services, multilateral agreement on investment, other non-trade agenda, dispute settlement and 
anti-dumping.  On the subject of trade liberalization in industrial products (Section 3), I argue that 
even though it is not a part of the UR built-in agenda, developing countries should agree to include 
it into negotiations.  The game of negotiating trade liberalization is not new and, since trade 
liberalization is generally beneficial to the countries undertaking such liberalization, risks associated 
with it are minimal.  In addition, developing countries can seek liberalization of key developed 
country markets including textiles and clothing, footwear, other leather products and fisheries. 
In agriculture (Section 4), I discuss in detail the main issues of interest relating to market 
access, export subsidies and domestic support.  I argue that for tariff reduction, it will make sense to 
seek a Tokyo-round-like formula whereby higher tariffs are reduced more and lower tariffs less.  As 
for tariff quota, I suggest that it may be best to eliminate it by bringing the out of quota tariff rate 
down immediately to the level that supports at least current level of imports.  The developing 
country interests should, in turn, be protected via a special GSP tariff rate that does not exceed the 
current in-quota tariff rate.  I also note that there is much scope for reductions in export subsidies in 
developed countries though their effects are going to be asymmetric on developing countries: 
potential exporters will benefit due to their improved competitive position while importers will be 
hurt due to an increase in the world prices. 
In services (Section 5), the UR built-in agenda requires negotiations on emergency 
safeguards, subsidies and government procurement.  In addition, there are some key negotiating 
issues to be resolved in the area of electronic commerce.  These include the classification of e-
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and the possibility of additional obligations on intellectual property rights (IPRs).  I argue that it 
makes sense to adopt a clean and clear-cut definition and suggest that e-commerce be classified as 
as trade in services with GATS discipline applied to it.  I also suggest whenever there is confusion 
with respect to the mode of delivery as between 1 and 2, we opt for mode 1.  On IPRs, I suggest that 
developing countries must take a careful look at the two treaties introduced by the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in December 1996.  Developed countries are bound to 
push for their eventual inclusion into the Agreement on TRIPs and the time to think about how to 
respond to that pressure is now. 
Two key areas of interest to developing countries in which the UR built-in agenda requires 
review are the Agreement on TRIPs and Dispute Settlement Understanding (Section 6).  Two 
provisions of the Agreement on TRIPs are to be reviewed: the provision on the protection of 
microorganisms and plant varieties and that on non-violation (as defined in GATT Article XXIII).  
Both reviews could have important implications for developing countries.  At a minimum, 
developing countries need to ensure that the review does not lead to a tightening of IPRs, for 
example, by requiring the application of UPOV, 1991 to plant variety protection.  A key question 
for developing countries in this area is whether they should go beyond the scheduled reviews by 
insisting on reopening the Agreement on TRIPs to achieve a better balance between the rights of 
producers and of users of knowledge and technology.  And if so, what are the possible approaches.  
While the changes that will benefit developing countries are easy to identify, the answer to the 
question whether they should follow this road is not clear cut.  Given the distribution of the 
bargaining power, it is not immediately obvious that once the Agreement is reopened, the outcome 
will not be even worse than what exists currently. 
  4 The review of the dispute settlement is ongoing and is likely to become a part of the Seattle 
Round agenda (Section 6.2).  Following Bhagwati’s (1999) suggestion, I argue that when disputes 
between two developed countries threaten to administer “shock therapy” to small, developing 
countries as in the Bananas case, a longer implementation period be permitted than is the current 
practice.  More generally, implementation should take into account economic factors rather than just 
the legal rights of plaintiffs who win the case.  There is also an acute need to improve the access of 
developing countries to the legal and professional services necessary to get a fair hearing in the 
Dispute Settlement Body (DSB).  Developed countries have substantial in-house resource to devote 
to these cases whereas even large developing countries lack them.  In the short run, this asymmetry 
needs to be corrected by the provision of resources that permit developing countries to hire private 
legal experts.  But since this solution raises serious confidentiality issues, in the long run, 
developing countries must develop their own in-house expertise. 
Regarding a multilateral agreement on investment (Section 7), I argue that it is premature to 
bring it to the negotiating table at the present time.  If this is nevertheless done, its scope should be 
limited strictly to direct foreign investment.  Even then, developing countries should insist on a 
parallel agreement on the movement of natural persons. Being by and large host countries, 
developing countries will be giving market access to developed countries in the area of investment.  
There is no reason for them, therefore, not to ask the latter for market access for temporary 
movement of natural persons in return. 
On other non-trade agenda (Section 8), principally labor and environmental standards, I 
recommend that this be taken out of the WTO for good.  There is now a substantial body of 
academic work that argues persuasively against bringing labor and environmental standards into the 
  5 WTO.  Instead, these agendas should be pursued in other institutions, designed specifically for 
them.  Developing countries should take a united stand in this regard. 
Anti-dumping (Section 9) is an area in which developed countries, especially the United 
States, do not appear keen to negotiate.  But since the anti-circumvention issue was on the UR built-
in agenda and has not been resolved, it may be possible to bring other anti-dumping issues into the 
Seattle Round agenda.  In that case, it will make sense to get an agreement that the sunset clause in 
the Anti-dumping Measures Code will not be misused to prolong protection even after injury to 
domestic industry has diminished.  Developing countries may also want to negotiate a general 
tightening of anti-dumping procedures since they are likely to face its use in a big way in the textiles 
and clothing sector once the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing begins to liberalize trade in this 
sector in an effective manner. 
The paper is concluded in Section 10. 
2.  Issues of Broad Strategy 
Before we launch into a detailed discussion of individual issues, it useful to focus on the 
broad strategy.  This subject has both a short-run and a long-run dimension.  In the short run, we 
must decide the ideal agenda for the next round from the viewpoint of developing countries.  We 
must decide which issues should be included in the Seattle Declaration and which ones should be 
relegated to the future.  In the long run, we must develop a strategy to respond to the pressures for 
concessions in selected areas that are likely to come on a continuous basis from developed 
countries.  Accordingly, the discussion in this section is divided into two parts, one aimed at sorting 
out the Seattle-Round agenda and the other with long-run strategy. 
  6 2.1  Narrowing Down the Seattle Round Agenda 
From the viewpoint of developing countries, it is perhaps best to keep the Seattle Round 
agenda limited to the Uruguay Round built-in agenda plus liberalization in industrial products.  The 
UR built-in agenda requires negotiations for increased market access in the areas of agriculture and 
services.  Adding industrial products will bring all sectors into negotiations.  In addition, the UR 
built-in agenda requires reviews of certain aspects of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), 
Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), Agreement on Trade-Related 
Investment Measures (TRIMs), Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, and the 
Agreement on Anti-dumping Measures.  Some of the reviews were supposed to have been 
completed by now.  But since that has not happened, they are likely to become a part of the Seattle 
Round agenda. 
The case for the inclusion of market access negotiations in industrial goods into the agenda 
is by no means uncontroversial and I will consider it in detail in the next section.  Presently, let me 
explain why it makes sense not to expand the agenda beyond this sector plus the built-in agenda.  
First, to my knowledge, none of the developing countries has studied systematically either the 
desirable contents or the implications of likely multilateral agreements in areas such as investment 
and competition policy.  Multilateral institutions and developed country think tanks have done some 
work but the message from this work is equivocal and, in any case, remains to be carefully studied 
and scrutinized by developing countries themselves.
1  It is only after a considerable analytic and 
country-specific empirical research that the desirability of agreements in these important areas can 
be judged and their proper design worked out.  It is a mistake to enter into negotiations without 
                                                 
1 For example, focusing on developing country interests, in a study published by the Institute for International 
Economics, Washington, D.C., Moran (1998) argues in favor of a multilateral agreement on investment.  
  7 some prior idea of the desired outcome.  The United States, for instance, rarely initiates negotiation 
in an area without a reasonably clear sense of the “endgame”.  Indeed, it is this consideration that 
has led the Antitrust Division of the United States Department of Justice to resist the inclusion of 
competition policy in the Seattle agenda.
2 
Second, at present, virtually all the major proposals on the table that go beyond trade 
liberalization and the UR built-in agenda have been brought up by developed countries.  Not 
surprisingly, on balance, they promise to serve the interests of developed countries without 
necessarily bringing symmetric gains to developing countries.  Some proposals such as the linkage 
between market access on the one hand and labor and environmental standards on the other will hurt 
developing countries outright.  In areas such as competition policy, where developing countries 
have traditionally asked for a multilateral code, developed countries are not interested in the 
inclusion of the disciplines desired by them.  Finally, even if a particular agreement advances the 
interests of developing countries, the distribution of benefits is vastly in favor of developed 
countries. It is not immediately obvious that in a bargaining context, developing countries should 
accept such a deal.  For instance, even if we accept the questionable proposition that a multilateral 
agreement on investment will bring benefits to developing countries, it does not follow that they 
should give away market access in this area without asking for something in return.  For instance, 
symmetry dictates that alongside an investment agreement, there also be an agreement on the 
movement of natural persons.  Such an agreement will result in developed countries giving market 
                                                                                                                                                             
Bernard Hoekman of the World Bank and Kamal Saggi of the Southern Methodist University, on the other 
hand, argue against it [Hoekman and Saggi 1999].   
2 This was evident from a presentation made by Joel Klein, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, 
the United States Department of Justice at the conference “The Next Trade Negotiating Round: Examining 
the Agenda for Seattle” held at Columbia University, July 22-23, 1999.  Klein expressed dismay that Leon 
Brittan of the European Community had insisted on a study group on competition policy in the Singapore 
Ministerial Declaration without a sense of what the endgame was. 
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investment.  But since the current ethos is unlikely to permit the inclusion of such proposals into the 
negotiating agenda, there is no reason to rush for the inclusion of investment into the agenda either. 
The final argument for a minimalist agenda for the Seattle Round is that developing 
countries lack negotiating capacity for a round with extended agenda.  Even large developing 
countries have few experts who understand the game of negotiations as well as their developed 
country counterparts.  An extended agenda spreads thinly whatever experts these countries do have, 
giving big developed country players such as the United States and European Union considerable 
advantage.  The developing country experts also lack the experience of their developed country 
counterparts.  The Uruguay Round was the first time the former participated in a negotiation of this 
kind whereas the latter have been at this game for half a century.  As the discussion below of the 
negotiations on the Agreement on TRIPs illustrates, this asymmetry in experience had a detrimental 
impact on the outcome in the Uruguay Round from the viewpoint of developing countries. 
Given the uneven distribution of bargaining power, it is not necessary that developing 
countries will be successful in limiting the agenda as described above.  Therefore, it makes sense to 
consider a second line of defense.  I will argue that under such circumstances, rather than adopt the 
single undertaking approach of the Uruguay Round, the negotiations be carried out on two separate 
tracks.
3  Trade liberalization and the built-in agenda should then be placed on one track and all other 
issues on a second track. 
                                                 
3 Ricupero (1998) offers a fascinating account of the evolution of the concept of single undertaking during 
the Uruguay Round negotiations.  The Punta del Este Mandate divided the proposed negotiations into two 
parts.  Part II dealt with trade in services while Part I with all other issues including industrial tariffs, 
agriculture, TRIPs, TRIMs, MFA and others. At the time the Mandate was adopted, the Latin American 
members of the Cairns Group were concerned that the liberalization of agriculture might be allowed to die in 
the course of negotiations as had happened in the previous rounds.  Therefore, they insisted on the inclusion 
of paragraph B(ii) in Part I, which states that “The launching, the conduct and the implementation of the 
  9 Even under this two-track approach, developing countries must seek a clear statement at 
Seattle that the social clause will not be a part of these or future negotiations under the auspices of 
the WTO and that no linkage between market access and labor and environmental standards will be 
sought.  As agreed at Singapore, the subject of labor standards should be sorted out through 
alternative instruments at the International Labor Organization (ILO). 
From the viewpoint of developing countries, this two-track approach has two important 
advantages.  First, it allows an agreement on the trade-liberalization package without requiring an 
agreement on other issues simultaneously.  Indeed, it even leaves the door open to plurilateral 
agreements among developed and advanced developing countries on issues relegated to the second 
track.  Second, it makes bargains more transparent by ensuring that concessions are balanced within 
broad areas without undue pressure for cross-sectoral demands. 
In this latter respect, the Uruguay Round approach of a single undertaking served 
developing countries poorly.  In effect, it resulted in developing countries accepting the Agreement 
on TRIPs in return for the removal of the Multifibre Agreement (MFA) by developed countries.  
The removal of the MFA promises to improve global efficiency by freeing up trade in textiles and 
clothing and benefit the developing as well as developed countries.
4  In contrast, the Agreement on 
TRIPs is expected to reduce global efficiency by extending the monopoly power of patent holders to 
                                                                                                                                                             
outcome of the negotiations shall be treated as parts of a single undertaking.”  Other developing countries 
went along with this provision presumably because they had no idea of the demands that were going to be 
made on them eventually as a part of the TRIPs negotiations (see below).  Furthermore, between the 
Montreal (December 1988) and Brussels (December 1991) Ministerial meetings, the concept of single 
undertaking itself underwent a significant change.  Based on the ideas supplied by the GATT secretariat, the 
EC and Canada proposed the incorporation of the results of the Uruguay Round into a new Multilateral Trade 
Organization (later renamed the World Trade Organization).  It was understood that the countries signing the 
the Uruguay Round Agreement would effectively withdraw from the GATT and join the new organization, 
leaving the non-signatory countries as contracting parties to a de facto defunct agreement.  Thus, the single 
undertaking not only came to encompass both Parts I and II of the Punta del Este Declaration but also became 
effectively mandatory for all members to sign. 
  10 developing countries for 20 years and is likely to result in a substantial redistribution of income 
from developing to developed countries.
5  Thus, while developed countries benefit from the bargain 
on both counts, developing countries benefit on one count but lose on the other.  On balance, the 
bargain promises to be more beneficial to developed than developing countries. 
A final important point from the short-run perspective is that developing countries must pay 
close attention to the final wording of the Seattle Declaration.  This declaration will serve as the 
constitution for the negotiations that will follow.  As such the wording of various provisions, 
especially those relating to non-trade issues in case they are included in the agenda, must be 
microscopically examined. The tighter the wording of the provisions the better.  As I argue 
immediately below, the experience of the Uruguay Round shows that loose wording can leave the 
door open to wide ranging negotiations in ways that can hurt the interests of developing countries. 
Thus, the absence of precise wording in the provision dealing with TRIPs in the Punta del 
Este Mandate was partially responsible for allowing developed countries to eventually force a wide 
ranging agreement in this area.  In their entirety, the provisions on TRIPs in the Mandate read as 
follows: 
In order to reduce the distortions and impediments to international trade, and taking 
into account the need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual property 
rights, and to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce intellectual property rights do 
not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade, the negotiations shall aim to clarify 
GATT provisions and elaborate as appropriate new rules and disciplines. 
 
Negotiations shall aim to develop a multilateral framework of principles, rules and 
disciplines dealing with international trade in counterfeit goods, taking into account work 
already undertaken in the GATT. 
                                                                                                                                                             
4 This statement refers to the aggregate welfare of developing and developed countries.  Taken individually, 
some developing countries may lose from the removal of the MFA due to the loss of quota rents. 
5 The conclusion on the global efficiency assumes (realistically) that the markets in developing countries 
being small, the extension of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) to them cannot lead to sufficiently large 
number of new innovations to offset the losses from the extension of the monopoly power of innovators.  See 
Panagariya (1999b) for further details. 
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These negotiations will be without prejudice to other complementary initiatives that 
may be taken in the World Intellectual Property Organization and elsewhere to deal with 
these matters. 
 
Taken on their face value, these provisions seem to aim at the development of disciplines on 
the enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs) rather than their norms and standards.  The 
explicit attention to disciplines on trade in counterfeit goods also suggests that the United States and 
European Community simply wanted to bring closure to their failed negotiations on a plurilateral 
agreement in this area under the Tokyo Round.  Indeed, this was generally the light in which 
developing countries saw the above provisions. 
For instance, Rubens Ricupero, Secretary General, UNCTAD has recently noted that when 
the concept of a single undertaking was agreed at Punta del Este, developing countries were “not 
aware of the real intentions of the developed countries in the TRIPs negotiations.”
6 In a more 
detailed analysis, B. K. Zutshi, India’s Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the GATT 
from 1989 to 1994, echoes Ricupero when he describes the differences between the interpretations 
of the above provisions by developing and developed countries in the following words:
7 
While services proved controversial even before the Round was launched, IPRs became so 
during negotiations when the Punta del Este Mandate in this respect was interpreted by 
developed countries to cover also the norms and standards of IPRs.  Developing countries, 
as a group, held the view that norms and standards of IPRs per se were not trade-related and, 
therefore, not covered by the mandate. 
 
As we all now know, the wording in the Punta del Este Mandate eventually did permit developed 
countries to bring the norms and standards centrally into the Agreement on TRIPs. 
  A somewhat similar story can be told with respect to the inclusion of trade-related 
investment measures.  There was just one sentence on these measures in the Punta del Este Mandate 
                                                 
6 See Ricupero (1998, p.17).  
7 See Zutshi (1998, p. 40).  
  12 that became the basis of the Agreement on TRIMs.  While this agreement was itself less far 
reaching than that on TRIPs, developed countries inserted into it a provision for further study of the 
investment and competition policy issues.  That provision, in turn, became the basis of setting up 
study groups for multilateral agreements on investment and competition policies in the Singapore 
Ministerial Declaration.  Thus, the eventual outcome of the single sentence in the Punta del Este 
Mandate can be full-fledged multilateral disciplines on investment and competition policies.  The 
implication of this experience is that if developing countries prefer not to negotiate at this stage in 
some areas and limit the scope of negotiations in others, they must act at the first stage of the game 
by paying a close attention to the language of the Seattle Declaration. 
2.2  The Long-Run Strategy 
Located in Geneva, WTO is far and away from most developing-country capitals; 
immediate, day-to-day domestic concerns in these capitals seem to leave little room for thinking on 
the long-term WTO issues even in the case of large developing countries.  Given the extreme 
importance of the eventual decisions made under the auspices of the WTO, at least large developing 
countries need to pay greater attention to thinking long-term strategies with respect to WTO issues 
on a continuous basis.  This is the approach taken by the United States and EU.
8 
Apart from isolated efforts of individual researchers, to-date, developing countries have 
relied almost exclusively on multilateral institutions for research on WTO matters.  This is a risky 
strategy.  Being dominated by developed countries and yet having broad acceptance as 
developmental institutions, at crucial moments, multilateral agencies such as the World Bank have 
successfully promoted the ethos that the interests of developed and developing countries are in 
                                                 
8 The United States maintains a permanent office straight across from the WTO in Geneva. 
  13 harmony.
9  While this may be true in matters such as trade liberalization, when it comes to issues 
such as the Agreement on TRIPs and the proposed social and environmental clauses in the WTO, 
the interests of developing and developed countries are in direct conflict. 
The danger of reliance for research on institutions such as the World Bank and GATT/WTO 
is amply illustrated by the experience during the Uruguay Round negotiations.  Researchers at these 
institutions emphasized only the benefits of the UR Agreement, often exaggerating them beyond 
what careful analysis will justify.  In the quantitative studies, based on the computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) models, the costs associated with the Agreement on TRIPs, which would have 
substantially lowered the estimated net benefits to developing countries, were systematically 
excluded.  And in the qualitative discussions, repeated claims were made that the Agreement on 
TRIPs was in the long-run interest of developing countries.
10  The upward bias in stating the 
benefits was further magnified by public relations officers of the respective institutions. When 
presented by their researchers with multiple estimates based on alternative assumptions, these 
officers invariably chose to give the largest rather than the most plausible estimates to the press. 
The ethos created by the studies that systematically overstate the net benefits of an 
agreement to developing countries while understating them for developed countries is likely to have 
an adverse effect on the bargaining power of the former.
11  It is for this reason that developing 
countries must devote substantial human and financial resource to research on WTO issues.  They 
                                                 
9 UNCTAD is the major exception but strapped for resources, its influence has been so far limited. 
10 The sole exception was a lone researcher at the GATT, Arvind Subramanian, who, working under an 
exceptionally evenhanded leadership of the then Director General of the GATT, Arthur Dunkel, predicted 
several billion dollars worth of losses to developing countries from the Agreement on TRIPs [see 
Subramanian 1990, 1994].  It will be naïve to expect similar openness from the WTO today.  Recently, while 
speaking at the WTO on the impact of TRIPs, I was struck by the steadfast refusal of the WTO staff to accept 
the proposition that the Agreement had harmed the interests of developing countries. 
  14 not only need to be able to assess critically the research done by the institutions that have a vested 
interest in promoting the interests of developed countries but must also offer and disseminate their 
own research to influence the international public opinion.  This means inviting developed country 
researchers and policy makers to their conferences and even organizing seminars in Geneva and 
Washington to present their viewpoint.  It is not sufficient, as is presently the practice, for merely 
developing country researchers and specialists to travel to developed country conferences to hear 
the viewpoint of the latter. 
It is also important in this context for developing countries not to rely excessively on the 
resources provided by developed countries directly or through multilateral institutions as a part of 
their “capacity building” initiatives.  The agency that funds the research is likely to exert influence 
on its outcome.  One way this can be accomplished is by opting for researchers who are favorably 
disposed towards the view supported by the funding agency itself.  Alternatively, given the 
researchers depend for funding on the agency, they are prone to being persuaded to the agency’s 
view.  Yet another instrument the funding agency has at its disposal is the selection of research 
topics themselves for funding.  For instance, to my knowledge, no multilateral agency has funded 
research on the benefits of promoting labor mobility from developing to developed countries while 
the same is not true of investment flows from developed to developing countries.  If the agencies are 
keen to promote the interests of developing countries, they should be as keen to fund research on 
labor mobility as they are on capital mobility. 
To summarize, in this section, I have made two broad recommendations.  First, at Seattle, 
developing countries should endeavor to limit the agenda for the next round to trade liberalization 
                                                                                                                                                             
11 Note that since the losses to developing countries from the Agreement on TRIPs were in large part due to 
redistribution of income from them to developed countries, the exclusion of the Agreement from the analysis 
also understated the benefits to the latter. 
  15 and the Uruguay Round built-in agenda.  If they do not succeed, they should still reject the single 
undertaking approach of the Uruguay Round in favor of a two-track approach whereby any 
additional items should be relegated to the second track.  Under no circumstances should they allow 
the social clause to be placed back on the agenda.  Second, in the long run, at least large developing 
countries must make a substantial commitment of human and financial resources to promote 
research of their own in the area of WTO issues.  With WTO agenda rapidly moving into areas 
where the interests of developing and developed countries are in conflict with each other, 
developing countries need to be able to make their case effectively.  That, in turn, requires research 
and its effective dissemination.  
3.  Trade Liberalization: Extending the Agenda to Industrial Products
12 
  In the previous section, I suggested that it is in the interest of developing countries to include 
industrial products into the Seattle Round trade liberalization agenda.  There are many reasons why 
the inclusion of these products, even though not required by the UR built-in agenda, is beneficial for 
developing countries. 
First, starting with TRIPs and TRIMs, developed countries have increasingly focused 
negotiations on what is essentially non-trade agenda.  Two obvious examples are labor and 
environmental standards.  Though the concerted action by developing countries and the support 
from some key developed countries at the Singapore Ministerial resulted in the issue of labor 
standards being delegated to the International Labor Organization, pressures for a social clause are 
very much there.  In addition, other non-trade issues, which almost always involve one-way 
concessions by developing countries, continue to form a part of the developed country agenda.  One 
                                                 
12 This section draws heavily on Panagariya (1998a, 1999a). 
  16 way to defuse this agenda is to re-focus attention on the conventional border-trade measures from 
whose liberalization all parties concerned can gain.  This is also the area in which the GATT had the 
greatest success. 
Second, the proliferation of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) in recent years has 
substantially undermined the Most Favored Nation (MFN) principle of trade policy.
13 There are 
now so many Preferential Trade Arrangements (PTAs) such as the North American Free Trade 
Agreement and the European Union's numerous association agreements that a virtual "spaghetti 
bowl" of crisscrossing preferential trade barriers has come to exist.  In member countries of these 
PTAs, different duties apply to different trading partners depending on the origin assigned to the 
imported product and the stage of liberalization within a particular PTA.  We therefore run the risk 
of reproducing the chaos created by the absence of the MFN status during the 1930s, produced then 
by protectionism but now, ironically, by free-trade intentions.  From the viewpoint of developing 
countries, the proliferation of PTA among developed countries has led to a partial loss of market 
access.  Many studies show that the EU and its various enlargements resulted in very substantial 
trade diversion.  Given the politics that often drives these PTAs, any attempts at reducing their 
spread do not seem to be likely to succeed.  Further trade liberalization, therefore, seems to be the 
most effective remedy for eliminating the chaos and recovering the market access for developing 
countries. 
Third, in recent years, the impression has been conveyed that, with developed-countries' 
post-Uruguay-Round average tariff rates coming down to 3 or less, these countries have reached a 
                                                 
13 For instance, Sapir (1998) notes that today, the European Union applies its MFN tariff to barely six 
countries (Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Taiwan and the United States) which account for 
approximately one third of its total imports. Tariffs on products from all other countries differ from the MFN 
tariff in one or the other way. 
 
  17 state of virtual free trade in industrial products.  Yet, from the viewpoint of developing countries, 
nothing could be farther from truth.  Despite an end to the MFA, to be completed by January 1, 
2005, tariffs in the United States, European Union and Japan on textiles and clothing will remain 
very high.  According to the calculations done by the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) (1996) (see Tables 1-3), the average tariff rates on products in this 
category are 14.6% in the United States, 9.1% in EU and 7.6% in Japan.  Within this category, 
many products have much higher tariffs.  In the United States, post-Uruguay-Round rates on 52% of 
textiles and clothing imports are between 15 to 35%.  Other categories of interest to developing 
countries with high post-Uruguay-Round tariffs are leather, rubber and footwear, and fish and fish 
products.  Post-Uruguay-Round tariffs on leather, rubber and footwear are 7.1% in the United 
States, 5.1% in EU and 8.3% in Japan.  Tariffs on fish and fish products are 10.2% in EU. 
Finally, despite much liberalization in recent years, developing countries continue to have 
sufficiently high tariffs on industrial products to engage developed countries in a bargain.  In the 
countries in South Asia, with the possible exception of Sri Lanka, tariffs are extremely high.  In East 
and Southeast Asia, they are lower, but still high by developed-country standards.  Tariffs in Latin 
America are also high when compared to those in developed countries. Thus, room for the first and 
perhaps last major North-South bargain exists. 
On the surface, it may seem that trade barriers in developing countries are higher than in 
developed countries, so that in a negotiation leading to more or less free trade across the board, the 
former will end up giving more concessions than they will receive.  Thus, the ensuing bargain will 
be uneven.  There are three possible responses to this argument.  First, developed-country markets 
are much larger than developing-country markets.  Therefore, a one-percent tariff reduction by the 
former, especially in products of interest to developing countries, is worth more than a similar 
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smaller, the gains to developing countries may be larger.  Second, developing countries being 
individually small, if a further round of multilateral trade negotiations is delayed, many of them are 
likely to carry out a substantial liberalization on a unilateral basis anyway.  Therefore, it may be in 
their self-interest to push for such a negotiation.  Finally, in a comprehensive round, concessions in 
industrial products can be exchanged against concessions in agriculture and services. 
Some may argue that with Information Technology Agreement successfully concluded, at 
least on a plurilateral basis, there is no need for comprehensive negotiations in industrial products.  
Negotiations can proceed along sectoral lines on a piecemeal basis.  In my judgement, such an 
approach is both inefficient and against the interests of developing countries.  First, to the extent that 
developed countries set the agenda, the sectors in which they have export interest will be liberalized 
first.  The Information Technology Agreement was clearly pushed by developed countries with 
developing countries accepting it as fait accompli at the Singapore Ministerial.  An extension of this 
approach is sure to place the sectors of interest to developing countries—in particular, textiles and 
clothingat the bottom of the liberalization timetable.  Second, a comprehensive negotiation offers 
a much greater scope for bargains than sectoral negotiations.  For instance, concessions in industrial 
products can be exchanged against those in agriculture or services.  Finally, from the standpoint of 
efficiency, simultaneous liberalization in several sectors is superior to sector-by-sector 
liberalization.  The former approach directly increases the profitability of sectors of comparative 
advantage and reduces the profitability of sectors of comparative disadvantage, allowing a rapid 
reallocation of resources. Being limited to a few sectors at a time, sectoral approach gives weaker 
signals for resource allocation.  Even more importantly, liberalization that is limited to a few sectors 
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harmful rather than beneficial during transition to complete free trade. 
In concluding this section, let me note that the proposal for liberalization I have made should 
be distinguished sharply from the one made by Bergsten (1996) prior to the Singapore Ministerial 
Conference.  Bergsten proposed what he called a "grand bargain" in which "the old rich pledge to 
avoid new barriers while the rapid growers commit to eliminate theirs."  (Here "rapid growers" 
refers to developing countries, especially in Asia.)  In my view, such a bargain is "grand" only for 
developed countries and hardly a "bargain" for the developing countries.  It is not clear how a 
"pledge to avoid new barriers" by one set of countries can be bartered for actual reduction in barriers 
by other countries. The "pledge" would be of some value if the countries offered to outlaw or at 
least limit substantially the use of some of the existing instruments of protection such as 
antidumping.  But, consistent with the official position of the United States, Bergsten's proposal 
included no such offers and, under the guise of a grand bargain, it sought one-way concessions 
from developing countries. 
4.  Trade Liberalization in Agriculture
14 
The UR Agreement on Agriculture, which effectively brought agriculture into the WTO 
fold, mandates negotiations in agriculture starting January 1, 2000.  This agreement has three main 
components: increases in import market access, reductions in farm export subsidies, and cuts in 
domestic producer subsidies.  In addition, other UR agreements, particularly, the Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) and the Agreement on Technical 
                                                 
14 This section draws heavily on UNCTAD (1999). 
  20 Barriers to Trade, have an important bearing on trade in agriculture.  The new round must make 
progress along each of these dimensions. 
In each of the three areas—import barriers, export subsidies and domestic support 
measures, the level of intervention is higher in developed than developing countries.  Purely in 
terms of import restrictions, this means larger benefits from liberalization to developing countries, 
especially for potential exporters of agricultural products (Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, 
Chile, and Philippines, for instance).  But the removal of subsidies on exports 
and output will hurt the developing countries that import the subsidized products.  Thus, distributive 
effects of liberalization in agriculture even among developing countries will be uneven. 
In the following, I consider briefly each of the three areas of liberalization. 
4.1 Market  Access 
  There are three aspects of market access in agriculture that deserve consideration (i) tariff 
liberalization, (ii) reform of tariff quota and (iii) reform of special safeguard provisions. 
 Tariffs 
The UR Agreement on Agriculture required that, taking 1986-88 as the base period, all non-
tariff barriers be converted into tariff equivalents.
15  These tariff equivalents were to be added to the 
existing tariffs and the total tariff bound.  The bound tariffs were then to be reduced by 36% on 
average with the rate on each item reduced by at least 15 percent by developed countries by January 
                                                 
     15Japan and the Republic of Korea got exemption in rice and developing countries in commodities that are 
staples in traditional diets. 
  21 1, 2000.  Developing countries were to reduce tariffs by 15% on average and at least 10% on each 
item and were given until January 1, 2005 to accomplish the task.
16 
  According to the available measures, tariff equivalents for the base period 1986-88 chosen 
by Members are far higher than the "true" tariff equivalents.  Table 4 presents these calculations for 
EU and the United States.  As shown in the fourth column, the proportion by which the announced 
base tariff rate exceeds the actual tariff rate (i.e., "dirty tariffication") is 61% for EU and 44% for the 
United States. 
  The second column in Table 4 shows the final tariff bindings for the major agricultural 
products in EU and the United States.  In addition, Table 5 provides the rates for all members of 
APEC (Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation) forum using a slightly different classification than in 
Table 4.  For many products, post-UR rates are high in both developed and developing countries but 
they are higher in the former.  There is substantial room for further negotiations and liberalization. 
  A key question concerns the approach that developing countries should take to future tariff 
reductions.  Given pervasive dirty tariffication, the ideal first step may be to insist on bringing the 
bound rates in line with actual rates.  For further liberalization, it will seem to make sense to push 
for the adoption of a formula similar to the one adopted in the Tokyo Round for industrial products.  
According to this type of formula, the higher tariffs will be reduced more and lower tariffs reduced 
less. 
This approach makes sense on efficiency as well as (mercantilist) strategic grounds.  Many 
of the peak tariffs in developed countries are extremely high so that the formula will reduce the 
                                                 
     16The average cut is calculated in a way that leaves a considerable flexibility.  Tangermann (1994) offers 
the following interesting example.  In a developed country, if there are four items of which three have 100% 
tariffs and one 4%, a 15% reduction in the former and the elimination of the latter yields (15+15+15+100)/4 
= 36.25% average reduction and satisfies the requirement.  This method of liberalization introduces a bias in 
favor of lowering the higher tariffs less and lowers tariffs more, thus, increasing the dispersion in tariff rates. 
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the last footnote on the previous page). Given the existence of tariff escalation with the stage of 
processing, especially in food sector, a Tokyo-Round-like formula will also help reduce effective 
protection more than a simple radial reduction.  Finally, since the tariffs in developed countries are 
higher than in developing countries, it would also induce greater liberalization in the former. 
 Tariff  Quota 
  The Agreement on Agriculture recognized that “dirty tariffication” could result in reduced 
market access in the products which some imports had been permitted previously through non-tariff 
measures such as voluntary export restraints and no new market access in other products.  To 
alleviate this problem, the Agreement introduced two provisions for import quotas.  First, to 
maintain “current access opportunities” in products previously subject to non-tariff measures, it 
required that imports must be maintained through explicit quotas at least at the 
level prevailing in the base period, 1986 to 1988.  Second, to 
provide “minimum access opportunities” in products with 
negligible imports before the UR, the Agreement required the 
introduction of a tariff quota that raises the share of imports in domestic consumption to at 
least 5% by the year 2000.  To ensure fulfillment of these provisions, the Agreement stipulated that 
countries adopt a two-tier tariff structure.  A `lower' tariff rate (a maximum of 32 percent of the 
bound tariff rates) was to be applied for the in-quota imports and a higher `bound' rate to the rest of 
imports. 
  These provisions have resulted in two types of import quotas in country Schedules: bilateral 
and global. The bilateral quotas have resulted from the provision to 
maintain “current access opportunities.”  These quotas are pre-
allocated to traditional export suppliers on the basis of 
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pre-UR quantitative restrictions and voluntary export restraints. 
The global, unallocated quotas, available in principle for 
distribution on an MFN basis, have resulted from the provision for 
“minimum access opportunities.”  In all, there are 1,366 tariff 
quotas specified under the Agreement on Agriculture.  Of these, 
fruits and vegetables account for 25.6 percent, meat products for 
18.2 percent, cereals for 15.7 percent and dairy products for 13.4 
per cent. 
  The tariff quota suffers from the usual problems that quotas bring.  The pre-allocated quota 
has an adverse effect on the entry of new, more efficient suppliers.  The global quota raises 
administrative problems and has resulted in a variety of schemes ranging from allocation on a first-
come, first-serve basis to giving the licenses to one’s own producers.  A further 
complication has arisen because the WTO has allowed member 
countries to incorporate their preferential trade arrangements 
(PTAs) into the market access opportunities available through the 
tariff quota system.  Although preferential quotas under those 
trading arrangements get counted as a part of the global, MFN 
tariff quota, the preferential treatment of designated exporters 
erodes the minimum access opportunities available on an MFN basis. 
Moreover, in-quota imports from PTA partners are also sometimes 
levied at a preferential rate that is lower than the going in-
quota MFN rate.   
There have also been numerous cases of imports falling short 
of the tariff quota commitments. In some cases, imports have been 
subject to the higher above-quota tariff rate even though the 
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the importing country considers that the quota to be "filled" once 
it has issued all the import licenses to exhaust its total quota.  
Whether or not the license holders actually make imports under the 
quota quantity is viewed as a “market choice”. Meanwhile, non-
license holders are charged the higher out-of-quota rate. 
  The next round will have to address all these problems.  Possible solutions are characterized 
by tensions between efficiency considerations and developing country interests.  The global 
efficiency will be best served by first unifying the bound tariff and the rate applicable to the tariff 
quota to the level that will ensure the minimum import requirement and then bringing the new tariff 
rate gradually down. In view of the fact that safeguard measures can be generally invoked to deal 
with unexpectedly large expansion of imports, it is unnecessary to limit imports through quantitative 
restrictions. 
  This approach may hurt the interests of many developing countries, however, by eliminating 
their market access at the current, in-quota tariff rate.  A solution to this dilemma may be to 
complement the above reform with a scheme via which the current in-quota exports by developing 
countries are placed under GSP with the current in-quota tariff rate serving as the GSP tariff rate. 
  Special Safeguard Provisions 
  The Agreement on Agriculture gives developed countries, but not developing countries, 
access to the Special Safeguard (SSG) provisions.  The SSG allow an importing 
country to impose an additional duty on out-of-quota imports of a 
product, if the country faces a sudden surge of import quantities 
or a substantial cut in import prices.  Ideally, the SSG should 
have been strictly a transition device to aid the tariffication 
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information exchange (AIE) Process at the WTO, it appears that 
these measures will stay beyond the year 2000.
17  At one level, it 
may be argued that only a few countries in a handful of cases have 
used the SSG and, therefore, it is not worthwhile to expend 
significant amount of the negotiating capital of developing 
countries.  Nevertheless, careful thinking is required on the 
issue since the frequency of use may rise dramatically after more 
liberalization. 
4.2 Export  Subsidies 
  The Agreement on Agriculture bans new export subsidies but allows the old ones to exist.  
Budget outlays on export subsidies are to be cut by 36% in developed countries and 24% in 
developing countries.  The volume of subsidized exports of each commodity is to be cut, in the case 
of developed countries, by 21% between 1995 and 2000 and, in the case of developing countries, by 
14% between 1995 to 2004 relative to their 1986-90 base-period averages.  
There is a sharp difference in the use of export subsidies 
between developed and developing countries. Export subsidies by 
six industrial countries in 1995 accounted for more than 75% of 
the global value of export subsidies subject to reduction 
commitments. Approximately 100 developing countries combined, on 
the other hand, accounted for just over 20 per cent of the global 
subsidies. Few developing countries had previously used export 
subsidies and hence did not include them in their Schedule of 
                                                 
17 The Singapore Ministerial Declaration had provided for the initiation of the analysis and information 
exchange (AIE) Process to allow member countries to better understand the issues to be discussed in future 
  26 Commitments.  The use of export subsidies by developed countries 
is concentrated on a few products, cheese, butter, wheat and beef. 
As noted before, the effects of export-subsidy reductions across various developing 
countries will be especially asymmetric depending on whether they are exporters or exporters of the 
products subject to subsidies.  Of particular importance is the need to protect the interests of net 
food importers that often also happen to be the poorest of the countries.  The role of food aid in this 
context could be potentially important. 
  The eventual aim of the next round should be to bring export subsidy provisions in 
agriculture in line with those applicable to industrial products.  In this area, much of the action is to 
be taken by developed countries and developing countries should vigorously seek in agreement 
from them.  It may even make sense for net exporters, who stand to benefit from export-subsidy 
reductions, to create a pool of resources to provide a cushion to net food importing least developed 
countries. 
  While export subsidies are still in force, additional issues must be addressed.  For instance, 
the Agreement on Agriculture leaves room for carrying over the “unused” export subsidies in one 
year to the other year.  This effectively permits countries to increase export subsidies in a given 
year.  From the viewpoint of potential exporters in developing countries, it will make sense to ban 
such flexibility provisions.  The Agreement on Agriculture also required the members to reach an 
agreement on export credit but this has not been accomplished so far.  The issue must be addressed 
now in the next round. 
                                                                                                                                                             
negotiations and identify their own interests. 
  27 4.3 Domestic  Support 
  The Agreement on Agriculture also sought to reduce the aggregate level of domestic support 
extended to agriculture. Most developed countries make extensive use of distortionary domestic 
policies to help farmers.  The Uruguay Round provided them an opportunity to 
carry out reforms of these policies, which had resulted in 
mounting surpluses and stockpiles of some commodities.  For most 
developing countries, domestic support policies are not a major 
issue.  As many as 61 of them have notified the WTO that they 
provide no domestic support that is subject to reduction 
commitments. 
There were three steps involved in the implementation of this provision.  First, the member 
countries were to compute the total domestic support extended to agriculture in the base years 
(1986-1988), termed as the `Aggregate Measure of Support' (AMS).  Second, AMS was to be 
capped at existing levels.  Finally AMS was to be reduced by 20 percent over a six-year period in 
developed countries and by 13% over a ten-year period in developing countries. 
The AMS applies at an aggregate level and not to individual commodities.  This means that 
countries have considerable flexibility in choosing the level of support they wish to extend to any 
particular commodity as long as the obligations towards the overall ceilings are met.  Furthermore, 
the  deminimus provision allows countries to exclude from the calculation of AMS (a) product 
specific support if it does not exceed 5 percent of the value of production of that commodity, and (b) 
non-product specific support where it does not exceed 5 percent of the value of the country's total 
agriculture production.  For developing countries, the deminimus level is 10 percent.  Specified 
agricultural input subsidies are also excluded from AMS. 
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from an efficiency standpoint, it makes sense to shift the focus from of this reform from the 
aggregate level to across-the-board reductions in the supports.  Alternatively, it makes sense to take 
up the sectors subject to the highest levels of supports first. 
The Agreement on Agriculture also allowed exclusion of two important agriculture support 
payments programs in calculating AMS, the EU compensation program under the 1992 CAP 
reforms and the US deficiency program.  The next round must also bring them into the fold of AMS 
calculations. 
4.4  Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) measures 
  As agricultural imports into developed countries are liberalized, the role of SPS measures in 
agricultural protection will become increasingly dominant.  Already, in some cases the 
SPS require production technology that is not available to 
developing country exporters.  Developing countries must not only 
have information on the existing SPS regulations in major 
developed countries but also technical guidance on how to satisfy 
them.  The Agreement on SPS recognizes the need for technical 
assistance to developing countries but leaves its provision to 
donor Members’ discretion.  In the next round, developing 
countries may find it worthwhile to negotiate a formal mechanism 
for ensuring the implementation of various provisions on technical 
assistance. 
  From a long-run perspective, developing countries will need 
to build local technical capacity to deal with the SPS measures 
whose use is bound to expand as trade in agriculture is 
liberalized.  They will need to acquire technical know-how to be 
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challenge them in the WTO when they are protectionist in intent. 
5.  Trade Liberalization in Services 
Negotiations on three items relating directly to the General Agreement on Trade in Services 
(GATS), emergency safeguards, subsidies and government procurement, were to have been 
completed by now under the built-in agenda.  But since these negotiations have remained 
unconcluded, they may become a part of the new round.  Since my own expertise in this area is 
limited, I discuss the three subjects briefly without suggestions on the strategy developing countries 
might want to pursue. 
5.1  Completing the GATS 
At present, GATS does not have a safeguards provision similar to Article XIX in GATT.  
Developed countries have been opposed to the introduction of such a provision while developing 
countries want it.  The former argue that GATS schedules contain built-in safeguards through 
limitations and qualifications such as economic needs tests, quotas and exclusion of sub-sectors.  
The latter argue that the absence of safeguard measures acts as a deterrent to liberalization.   
Logically, both positions are defensible so that the ultimate resolution would seem to lie in 
empirical evidence.  To strengthen the position taken by developing countries, it will be useful to 
document specific cases in which countries have been discouraged from liberalization due to a lack 
of safeguard measures. 
GATS recognized that subsidies may have distortive effects on trade in services but left the 
development of multilateral disciplines applicable to them for future negotiations.  The broad 
position taken by developing countries is that developing countries need flexibility in the use of 
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as is true of the GATT discipline on goods.  At present, the issue is unsettled but the resolution of it 
is likely to have serious implications since it also covers the provision of services through 
commercial presence and hence impacts subsidies on foreign investment in services. 
Like GATT, GATS also exempts government procurement from non-discrimination and 
market-access provisions.  It provided for multilateral negotiations within two years but little 
progress has been made.  In December 1996, the Singapore Ministerial Declaration established a 
work program to “conduct a study of transparency in government procurement practices, taking into 
account national policies, and based on this study, to develop elements for inclusion in an 
appropriate agreement.” Discussions in the Working Group on Transparency in Government 
Procurement have covered matters such as information on national legislation, prior information on 
procurement opportunities, tendering and qualification requirements, conditions for fairness, 
accountability and integrity in evaluation procedures, and surveillance and enforcement 
mechanisms.  It is not clear at this point whether negotiations on government procurement will 
become an integral part of the next round.  Regardless, developing countries need to study the 
subject in detail since, to my knowledge, little effort has been made by them to analyze the pros and 
cons of the inclusion of the subject in negotiations and in which direction to take them.  The 
countries should also bear in mind that the UR built-in agenda refers to the treatment of the 
government procurement practices in services and does not extend to goods. 
5.2 Electronic  Commerce 
  An important area of negotiations in services in the forthcoming round is bound to be 
electronic commerce.  Two key issues that will have to be resolved are whether the GATT or GATS 
discipline should apply to electronic commerce and, assuming it is GATS, should such trade be 
  31 classified under mode 1 (cross-border transactions) or mode 2 (consumption abroad).  In addition, 
subjects relating to the protection of Intellectual Property Rights and mutual recognition of 
standards may also be negotiated. 
A consensus appears to have emerged among member countries that trade via electronic 
mediums, particularly Internet, should be classified as trade in services with GATS discipline 
applied to it.  My own view is that even though there is some merit in the argument that the products 
with physical counterparts (for example, books, computer software and music) should be classified 
as goods even when they are transmitted by Internet, it makes sense to adopt a clean definition.  
Any attempts at defining some products as goods and others as services are likely to result in 
disputes.
18 
From negotiating standpoint, developing countries need to guard against any attempt at 
defining all electronic trade as goods with GATT discipline applied and an agreement for no custom 
duty signed.  Adopting the GATT discipline automatically extends the national treatment and MFN 
to electronic trade.  And the agreement on zero custom duty forbids the application of custom duty.  
In effect, the countries commit themselves to free trade in all services trade by Internet even if they 
did not make such a commitment in their GATS Schedules.  At one point, the United States had 
pushed for this approach.  The attempt was thwarted by the European Union, which did not want its 
audio-visual imports to be freed automatically.  But it does not mean that the approach will not be 
tried once again, perhaps giving an exception to audio-visual industry thereby getting the European 
Union on board.  If a decision to revert back to adopting the GATT discipline on electronic trade is 
made, developing countries should make sure that they do not sign the agreement for zero custom 
duty without negotiating something in return. 
                                                 
18 For further details, see Panagariya (1999c). 
  32 Assuming the GATS discipline is applied to electronic trade, the member countries will still 
need to decide whether electronic trade is treated as cross-border trade (mode 1) or consumption 
abroad (mode 2).  The classification has two principal implications.  First, it will determine the 
liberalizing impact of the commitments made in the UR and post-UR GATS negotiations on 
services.  In these negotiations, countries have already made commitments based on the modes of 
supply of services. Therefore, it matters whether electronic trade is treated as being supply by mode 
1 or mode 2.  For example, if a country gave full market access under mode 2 for a particular 
financial service that is traded electronically, the commitment would have no liberalizing impact if 
electronic commerce is classified as supply under mode 1 rather than 2.  Thus, the liberalizing 
impact of previous commitments will depend on the mode supply under which electronic commerce 
is classified.  It is my impression that countries undertook more obligations for liberalization under 
mode 2 than under mode 1.  Accordingly, the liberalizing impact of the commitments will be greater 
if electronic commerce is classified under mode 2.  Developed countries, which are net exporters of 
electronic services, stand to gain greater market access if these services are classified as being 
supplied under mode 2. 
Second, the classification determines the country of jurisdiction for purposes of regulation 
and dispute settlement.  For supply under mode 1, the transaction is deemed to have taken place in 
the country where the buyer resides.  Therefore, it is the regulatory regime of the importing country 
that applies to the transaction.  In contrast, for supply under mode 2, it is the relevant regulatory 
regime is that of the country where the supplier resides.   If countries feel that they want to protect 
their buyers’ interests, they are likely to opt for mode 1.  Thus, there is some tension in the choice of 
classification depending on the objective.  The market access objective pulls towards mode 2 while 
consumer protection objective pulls towards mode 1. 
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granted under Article VII of GATS either unilaterally or through bilateral agreements to education 
or experienced obtained, requirements met, or licenses or certificates granted in another country.  
Such recognition, when granted, may boost a country’s exports via electronic means.  Since the 
recognition is permitted by GATS on a non-MFN basis and is likely to be confined to developed 
countries, however, it can potentially cause trade diversion from developing countries.  Article VII 
of GATS requires that the recognition of standard not have unduly trade-diverting effects on third 
parties and developing countries should guard their rights in this respect. 
Finally, the issue of IPR protection on Internet is also likely to be raised in the next round.  
The main issues in this area relate to copyright and related rights, trademarks, access to technology, 
and enforcement.  There is work in progress on these issues at the World Intellectual Property 
Rights Organization (WIPO).  In particular, developing countries must study carefully the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty and WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty adopted in December 1996.  
These treaties are to come into force after 30 countries have approved them.  These treaties commit 
the signatories to the enforcement of IPRs on the Internet in the relevant areas.  During the new 
round, pressures are likely to come on developing countries to sign these treaties and perhaps to 
bring them into the WTO.  In principle, developing countries could argue that IPRs in this area are 
not a part of the UR built-in agenda and, therefore, should be relegated to second track. 
6. Other Items on the Uruguay-Round Built-in Agenda 
  Two additional areas in which the UR built-in agenda requires action with important 
implications for developing countries are the Agreement on TRIPs and Dispute Settlement.  I will 
discuss the issues related to these reviews the present section. 
  34 As a result of the built-in agenda in the Agreement on TRIMs, the Singapore Ministerial 
Declaration also set up study groups on investment and competition policy at the WTO.  While the 
subject of investment policy will occupy us in Section 7, I will not cover competition policy in the 
paper since there is little chance that it will be on the Seattle Round agenda.  There is also a small 
review component in the UR Agreement on Anti-dumping Measures, which I will take up in the 
separate section towards the end of the paper. 
6.1  The Agreement on TRIPs
19 
The built-in agenda requires the members to review Article 27.3b of the Agreement on 
TRIPs.  This article makes exception for plants and animals but obliges members to provide 
intellectual property protection to microorganisms and plant varieties.  For plant varieties, members 
may apply patents, an effective sui-generis regime or a combination of the two. 
In the Council for TRIPs, there is no agreement among members regarding the meaning of 
“review”.  Developed countries take the position that it stands for the “review of implementation” 
while developing countries view it as an opening to revise the text.  If the latter interpretation does 
prevail, it is not clear whether the outcome will be necessarily favorable to developing countries.  
The possibility cannot be ruled out that developed countries will then push for plant variety 
protection in accordance with the UPOV Convention, as revised in 1991.  They may also ask for the 
introduction of patents on plants and animals.  Both changes will hurt the interests of developing 
countries.  Developing countries, on the other hand, would like to push for some form of protection 
for the “traditional knowledge” of indigenous communities.  Some NGOs would also like to see the 
article revised to ensure that naturally occurring materials are not patentable. 
                                                 
19 This section is based on Correa (1999). 
  35   A second built-in agenda item on TRIPs concerns the application of the non-violation clause 
of the GATT [Article XXIII: 1(b) and XXIII: 1(c)] to the Agreement on TRIPs at the end of the 
transitional period.  Under Article 64.3 of the Agreement on TRIPs, the TRIPs Council is required 
to examine the scope and modalities of complaints under the non-violation clause and submit its 
recommendations to the Ministerial Conference for approval.  It is expected that several developing 
countries will fail to comply with the provisions of the Agreement on TRIPs by December 31, 1999 
when the transitional period end.  The USTR has already announced that it will assess the situation 
at the end of the year to take action under the dispute settlement mechanism.  One possibility for 
developing countries is to negotiate an extension of the non-application period under Article 65.2 of 
the Agreement on TRIPs. 
  A key issue for developing countries is whether to go beyond the built-in agenda in the area 
of TRIPs.  Several proposals have been offered to revise the Agreement on TRIPs in a future round.  
Correa (1999) considers three possible strategies along which revisions of the Agreement can be 
demanded from the viewpoint of developing countries.  First, a comprehensive revision may be 
sought.  In defining the objectives, Article 7 of the Agreement states that IPRs should promote 
innovations and dissemination and transfer of technology “to the mutual advantage of producers and 
users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to 
a balance of rights and obligations.”  Developing countries may argue that in its current form the 
Agreement serves primarily the interest of producers of technology and does not pay adequate 
attention to the rights of users of technology.  Nor does it fully promote social and economic 
welfare.  Under this scenario, developing countries could push for a reduction of the duration of 
patent protection from 20 years to a smaller number.  They may also seek clear statement on various 
  36 elements of flexibility in the Agreement including parallel imports, non-patentability of the uses of 
known products, price regulations, and compulsory licensing on various grounds. 
  A second strategy will take de minims approach, opening for renegotiations only a few 
items.  The rationale for this approach is that once the Agreement is opened for extensive revisions, 
the final outcome is uncertain.  Developed countries may then be able to rewrite other parts of the 
Agreement in a way that the ultimate outcome may be worse that the existing Agreement. 
  Finally, developing countries may seek revisions in the Agreement based on specific 
objectives such as the transfer of technology, biodiversity, environment, health and competition.   
Correa (1999) lists some of the specific changes that could be sought to achieve these objectives. 
Proposals have also been made by developing countries, especially India, along these lines. 
6.2 Dispute  Settlement
20 
  The present dispute settlement system replaced the old GATT dispute settlement system on 
January 1, 1995.  Several developments relating to the operation of the system can be noted.  First, 
there has been a dramatic increase in the number of consultations sought by members.  In the first 
four and a half years of its operation ending on June 30, 1999, there were 175 requests for 
consultation, involving 130 distinct matters.  This averages to approximately 40 consultations per 
year, which is approximately four times the rate under the GATT dispute settlement system.   
Second, Consultations have played a central role in dispute settlement.  Of the 138 consultation 
requests made until June 30, 1998, 72 had not been brought before a panel as of July 1999.  Though 
some of these cases may still end up before a panel, this figure suggests that more than half of the 
cases were settled via consultation.  Third, developing countries have been active participants in the 
                                                 
20 This section is based on Davey (1999), Hudec (1999) and Jackson (1998). 
  37 process.  They have brought cases against not only developed countries but, for the first time, other 
developing countries as well.  Finally, the rate of compliance has been generally high.  This has 
been true for the cases won by developing countries against developed countries as well.  According 
to Davey (1999), all parties not in compliance with their WTO obligations have indicated that they 
intend to comply with the recommendations of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) within a 
reasonable period of time.
21 
Jackson (1998) views all these developments as positive.  For instance, he views larger 
number of consultations as perhaps reflecting increased confidence by the WTO members in the 
new procedure.  He also suggests that the settlement of a large proportion of the cases at the 
consultation stage could be an indication that the procedures are enhancing and inducing 
settlements.  ‘Governments start a procedure, and then as the procedure advances more becomes 
known about the case.  At some point, the jurisprudence will suggest to the participants the likely 
outcome of the case and this will induce settlement, consistent with the rules as interpreted in the 
prior cases.’
22   
At the conclusion of the Uruguay Round negotiations, it was decided that the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding (DSU) should be reviewed by the end of 1998 and a decision taken on 
whether to continue, modify or terminate it. The review is still ongoing, however, and may become 
part of the Seattle Ministerial process.  Davey (1999) identifies five issues that have been raised in 
the review: the operation of the surveillance function, the professionalization of panels, the 
                                                 
21 Davey (1999) offers the following record as of June 30, 1999.  Implementation had occurred in 8 out of the 
23 cases completed by the DSB.  In another 4 cases, no implementation was required since the complainants 
had lost.  In 7 of the remaining 11 cases, the reasonable period of time for implementation had not expired.  
The remaining 4 cases are EC-Bananas (2 cases), EC-Hormones and EC-Poultry.  In the Bananas and 
Hormones cases, the DSB has accepted retaliation by the affected parties against specified value of imports 
from the EC as being equivalent to the nullification and impairment suffered by them.  Negotiation on EC-
Poultry case between Brazil and the EC were ongoing as of June 30, 1999. 
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issues, and the adequacy of the resources available to the WTO for processing disputes.  Of these, 
first three have direct implications for developing countries and I consider them below in detail. 
The Surveillance Function 
In the case of disagreement on non-implementation, the DSU rules on suspension of 
equivalent concessions do not work well.  On the one hand, Article 21.5 of the DSU says that such a 
disagreement should be referred to the original panel, which must issue its report in 90 days.  On the 
other hand, Article 22.2 of the DSU says that, on request, the DSB must authorize suspension of the 
concessions, absence consensus to the contrary, within 30 days of the expiration of the reasonable 
period permitted for implementation.  At present there is disagreement among members on how to 
resolve this conflict.  The source of contention is not the procedure itself but the timeframe within 
which this final step in the process is to be completed.  The issue may become a part of the Seattle 
agenda. 
From the viewpoint of developing countries, Bhagwati (1999) has raised an important issue 
with respect to the strict timetables followed by the DSB procedure.  Referring to the Bananas case, 
he notes that strict timetables can sometimes result in substantial “shock therapy imposed by legal 
means” on third countries that cannot cope with rapid and substantial adjustment costs.  In the 
Bananas case, the parties directly involved are the United States and the EC while the countries that 
must bear adjustment costs are tiny, island economies.  The tight DSB timetables reflect the rights 
of successful plaintiffs rather than the economic difficulties of the true targets of adjustment. 
                                                                                                                                                             
22 Jackson (1998, p. 340). 
  39 Bhagwati makes two suggestions to deal with this problem which developing countries may 
wish to take up in the forthcoming negotiations.  First, the WTO members should recognize that the 
adjustment period must reflect the economic problems resulting from the finding and that the 
problems may lie outside of the economies of the parties directly involved in the dispute.  The 
current timetables are determined by legal, rather than economic, considerations.  Second, the WTO 
Director General should simultaneously coordinate short-term relief from the World Bank or the 
International Monetary Fund, while also getting the World Bank to direct some long-term aid to 
offset the loss of the real income. 
Professionalization of Panels 
  Panel members are usually three diplomats drawn from the GATT delegations of countries 
perceived to be neutral to the dispute.  Hudec (1999) observes that while panel members today are 
usually well-versed in WTO policy and procedures, and are generally persons with reputation for 
good judgement among their fellow diplomats, most of them lack legal training, or experience, to 
render professionally competent judgements on complex legal issues.  As a result, secretarial legal 
advisors have often exercised considerable influence on the outcomes.  Critics have questioned this 
role of the Secretariat and charged that Secretariat officials have no mandate to perform this 
decision-making role. 
  This role of the Secretariat officials should be of considerable concern to developing 
countries.  To begin with, there is a general dominance of developed country views and interests at 
the WTO Secretariat.  In addition, the officials of the Secretariat, especially lawyers, are 
predominantly from developed countries.  Therefore, they are easy targets of lobbying by developed 
countries, giving the latter extra advantage in disputes with developing countries. 
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hoc, part-time panelists be replaced by well one in which panelists will be professionals with long-
term appointments like the four-plus-four year contracts held by Appellate body members currently.  
Hudec (1999) estimates that, continuing the current practice of three-member panels, at the current 
level of disputes, this will require the appointment of 18 panelists and will constitute a substantial 
burden on the WTO resources.  Developing countries must study this proposal carefully since it 
may be desirable to adopt even if it means sharing in the costs of employing professional panels.  It 
is crucially important to distance the Dispute Settlement process from the WTO Secretariat and 
ensure that panels rather than the Secretariat staff assisting them exercise the real decision-making 
power. 
Barriers to Developing Country Access 
Though the DSU operation has sometimes been advertised as an unequivocal success and 
equally accessible to all members, the experience of at least some developing countries has been 
otherwise.  Despite facial equality, due to a lack in-house technical expertise, developing countries 
have not been able to access the process as effectively as developed countries.  In is instructive to 
quote Jackson (1998, p. 343) in this context: 
Small governments in particular often do not have in-house expertise that is adequate to 
handle some of the complex cases (or even some of the simple cases) which are finding their 
way into the WTO Dispute Settlement arena. Such states are put at a substantial 
disadvantage against large entities like the USA or the European Community which have 
such in-house expertise. These smaller states consequently have in some circumstances been 
eager to retain the services of private attorneys, usually Europeans or Americans. But there 
has been some objection made, most often by the USA, to the practice. During the course of 
the last year, developments seem to have moved very substantially in the direction of 
permitting this practice of governments retaining private attorneys, with certain limitations. 
 
Even after countries are permitted to retain private attorneys, two problems remain.  First, 
most developing countries face severe fiscal constraints and, thus, lack resources to hire the 
  41 attorneys.  Second, the retention of private attorneys raises concerns with respect to their 
relationship vis-a-vis government clients and the WTO system.  Once again, it is useful to quote 
Jackson: 
It will be wise for the DSB or other appropriate bodies to develop certain standards and 
ethical rules, perhaps including conflict-of-interest rules as well as confidentiality rules, 
which would generally be recommended to governments as part of the contract they use to 
retain attorneys. Hopefully this matter will receive appropriate attention and the appropriate 
practices and documents will evolve. 
 
In the short run, developing countries face the problem of resources to use the DSU process 
effectively.  Recently, a group of developed and developing countries have announced plans to 
launch an Advisory Center on WTO Law.  This Center will function as an international 
intergovernmental organization and provide legal assistance to developing countries in WTO 
matters (Davey 1999). 
Despite substantial pledges, it is not clear at present whether sufficient funding for the 
Center will be forthcoming.  But even assuming the funding comes through, in the long run, 
developing countries need to create native technical capacity in this area.  Reliance on the U.S. or 
European private attorneys or the proposed Center should be viewed as a short-term solution only.  
In the ultimate, like their developed country counterparts, developing countries need qualified in-
house staff with deeper knowledge of the circumstances and interests of the country concerned. 
7.  Responding to the Demands for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment
23 
The phenomenal expansion of foreign direct investment (FDI) in recent years has turned 
multinationals into a powerful lobby for a multilateral agreement on investment. Today, these firms 
operate under a host of bilateral investment treaties and access to capital in many parts of the world 
                                                 
23 This section builds on Panagariya (1998b). 
  42 is not entirely free. They, therefore, have a strong vested interest in the establishment of a uniform 
set of international rules governing the flow of investment that can be enforced the dispute 
settlement body of WTO. 
7.1  The Failed OECD Agreement 
Soon after the conclusions of the Uruguay Round, responding to pressures from 
multinationals, developed countries had begun to seek a uniform set of rules governing the 
movement of capital, especially direct foreign investment (FI).  As early as 1995, they launched 
negotiations for a Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) among the members of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). 
Though there was much enthusiasm for the MAI initially, the 29 OECD members failed to 
reach a consensus and negotiations broke down in late 1998.  The negative outcome was partially 
the result of far-reaching nature of the proposed agreement, which was expected to cover not just 
direct foreign investment but technical know how and portfolio investment as well.  Many 
governments felt that the agreement will greatly restrict their ability to regulate the flow of portfolio 
capital for which they were not prepared. 
Many non-governmental organizations (NGOs) also opposed the agreement, arguing that it 
gave excessive powers to multinationals.  Following the provisions in NAFTA, the proposed 
agreement would have given multinationals the right to sue host governments for damages caused 
by its violation.  Drawing on several cases brought against NAFTA governments, some NGOs 
argued that foreign investors would seek compensation for the costs associated with satisfying 
domestic environmental, health and safety regulations.  Some NGOs also argued that the proposed 
agreement was one-sided in giving multinationals rights without spelling out their obligations 
towards consumers, workers and the environment. 
  43   Eventually, the member countries could agree only on a minimal package whose provisions 
were weaker than those of many bilateral treaties between developed and developing countries.  
This, in turn, led to the erosion of support from multinationals themselves.  Towards the end, feeling 
the pressure of aggressive campaign by NGOs and upon a belated realization that GATS obligations 
entail automatic extension of the liberalization within the MAI framework to non-OECD WTO 
members, many governments, especially France, became reluctant to go ahead with the agreement.  
The fate of MAI was, thus, sealed.
24 
This failure of the MAI does not signify an end to the efforts by developed countries to seek 
a uniform investment regime, however.  Instead, they are now likely to pursue this goal more 
vigorously in the WTO.  It may be recalled that, taking advantage of a provision in the TRIMs 
Agreement of the UR Agreement, at the maiden WTO Ministerial Conference held at Singapore in 
December 1996, developed countries had successfully placed the study of an eventual investment 
agreement on the WTO agenda.  Despite misgivings, expressed by some key developing countries, 
in the Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WTO Members went on to agree to establish a working 
group to examine the relationship between trade and investment. 
7.2  Developing Country Interests 
Even though some developing countries engage in outward FDI, they are largely recipients 
of this type of investment.  Developed countries, on the other hand, serve as "source" countries for 
FDI into developing countries.  As I will explain later, this asymmetry leads to a divergence of 
interests between developing and developed countries.  There is, thus, a clear North-South 
dimension to the multilateral agreement on investment. 
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  44 It may be argued that, beyond what has already been agreed in the Uruguay Round General 
Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) and Agreement on TRIMs, any agreement on investment 
will be unrelated to trade. Therefore, a separate agreement on investment falls into “non-trade” 
agenda and, as argued in the next section, does not belong in the WTO. 
If discussions for such an agreement, nevertheless, proceed, it is important for developing 
countries to place their own agenda on the table.  I will argue that there are at least four key 
items that belong on that agenda at the present moment.  First, developing countries must ensure 
that any investment agreement is confined to FDI.  The benefits of liberalization in areas of trade 
and FDI are much better understood than in the area of financial-capital flows, which have a very 
large speculative component.  Until such time as internal distortions in the banking and financial 
sectors are largely removed, free flows of financial capital bring with them added risk of 
financial crises.  Many developing countries are long ways from having distortion-free banking 
and financial sectors and cannot afford to give up national discretion in policy making with 
respect to financial-capital flows.  The countries wishing to go beyond DFI are naturally free to 
negotiate a separate plurilateral agreement. 
Second, even on FDI, developing countries should insist that no negotiations proceed until 
China has been admitted to the WTO.  That country is the world's second largest recipient of direct 
foreign investment.  Among developing countries, it is by far the largest recipient.  Therefore, if 
developing-country interests are to get a fair hearing, it is essential that China be a party to the 
negotiations.  Without that, the bargaining power of developing countries is likely to be seriously 
limited. 
Third, any agreement must pay adequate attention to the "host" country interests rather than 
serving as the bill of rights for multinationals.  For example, it must provide for an end to subsidies 
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the issue, the failed OECD agreement was not a good model in this regard.  These subsidies are a 
direct transfer from host countries to the corporations.  Moreover, they distort DFI in the same way 
that export subsidies distort trade.  Given that the latter are prohibited under the GATT, any 
agreement on investment should prohibit the former.  The agreement should also spell out clearly 
the obligations of multinationals. 
Finally, and most importantly, developing countries should agree to an investment 
agreement only in return for an agreement on the movement of natural persons.  This stance is 
justified for at least two reasons.  First, the benefits from international movement of labor are much 
larger than from the movement of capital.  The only calculations of these benefits, done by 
Hamilton and Whalley (1984), show that the benefits of international movement of workers dwarf 
the benefits from liberalization in any other area.  They summarize their findings in following terms: 
“In spite of the sensitivity to the values of substitution elasticities, these results 
suggest large gains from the removal of global immigration controls.  In most cases the gain 
exceeds the worldwide GNP generated in the presence of the controls suggesting that 
immigration controls are one of the (and perhaps the) most important policy issues facing 
the global economy.  A large portion of the gains is accounted for by labor migration 
occurring between aggregate rich and poor regions. Relatively little additional gain results 
from labor migration occurring between individual countries beyond the gains from 
migration between the seven major regions.  The impact of restrictions on labor mobility is 
thus clearly an issue between rich countries as a bloc and poor countries as a bloc rather than 
between individual countries.” 
The second reason for placing labor mobility on the agenda is that the distribution of gains 
from factor mobility is heavily in favor of the source country.  This is because the migrating factor 
receives the high return prevailing in the host country rather than the low return in the source 
country.  And since developed countries are likely to be the source country for investment, they will 
reap a much larger share of benefits from the mobility of capital.  In contrast, since developing 
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the lion's share of the benefits from labor mobility. 
It is fashionable in developed countries to dismiss even the idea of labor mobility on 
grounds that there is no political support for it.  But there are at least three reasons why developing 
countries should not take such dismissals seriously.  First, in the Uruguay Round, some developing 
countries had felt that political costs of the Agreement on TRIPs were too high for them to sign the 
UR Agreement.  But those countries eventually signed the Agreement because they viewed the deal, 
taken as a whole, to be beneficial.  If developed countries see the benefits from an agreement on 
investment to be sufficiently large, they, too, can overcome the political costs of an agreement on 
labor.  Second, with the issue of a multilateral investment rules having been placed on the agenda, 
symmetry dictates that labor mobility also be placed on the table.  The history of GATS negotiations 
supports this argument.  Initially, the movement of natural persons was not on the table but was 
included later at the insistence of developing countries.  Finally, political pressures in the United 
States and EU are largely concentrated in the market for unskilled labor.  The same need not apply 
to professional services for which shortages exist. 
To make the movement of natural persons a central item in the WTO agenda, work is 
needed at three levels.  First, it is necessary to identify specific areas where both sides can engage in 
mutually beneficial bargains.  Second, in recent years, numerical estimates of likely benefits from 
liberalization have become an important strategic tool of negotiations.  Therefore, it is important to 
calculate numerically the likely benefits of increased labor mobility.  Developing countries must 
undertake this exercise themselves.  Given the constraints imposed on multilateral institutions such 
as the World Bank and WTO, they are unlikely to carry out this exercise even as they do a parallel 
exercise for a multilateral agreement on investment.  Finally, and most importantly, developing 
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with developed countries.  Without a general agreement among the OECD countries, investment 
policy is unlikely to be included in the agenda for the next WTO round. Without a general 
agreement among the developing countries, labor mobility will not be included in it. 
8.  Other Non-trade Agenda 
  In recent years, developed countries have increasingly insisted on bringing “non-trade” 
agenda into the WTO.  The process began with the inclusion of IPRs and is continuing to move in 
that direction with proposals for social and environmental clauses in the WTO put on the table.  
Developing countries have good reason to fear from this trend and to ensure that its advance is 
arrested immediately. 
  To begin with, trade liberalization and "non-trade" agenda are fundamentally different.   
Trade liberalization benefits everyone including the country that undertakes such liberalization.   
When undertaken multilaterally, trade liberalization produces positive efficiency effects without 
significant redistributive effects.  "Non-trade" agenda, by contrast, produces efficiency effects of a 
dubious nature and large redistributive effects that often benefit rich countries at the expense of poor 
countries.  For instance, taken in isolation, the Agreement on TRIPs promises to lower the welfare 
of not just developing countries but the world as a whole.  The same can also be said of the 
proposed link between trade and labor and environmental standards.  There is no guarantee that the 
particular social and environmental agendas, pushed principally by labor and environmental lobbies 
in developed countries, will improve welfare in the latter countries or the world as a whole.   
Moreover, it could place the current market access and trade at risk. 
  Quite apart from this fundamental difference between trade liberalization and non-trade 
agenda, there is a marked asymmetry between the effects of the proposed agenda on developed and 
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to flow from developing to developed countries. Thus, the Agreement on TRIPs will essentially 
redistribute income from developing to developed countries.  Innovators, who stand to benefit from 
the extension of their monopoly power to developing countries, are overwhelmingly the citizens of 
developed countries.  Consumers over whom the additional monopoly power has been extended are, 
by contrast, citizens of developing countries.  The focus of the social agenda is similarly on child 
labor in developing countries without a corresponding attention being paid to the welfare of the 
children in inner cities or to that of migrant labor in developed countries.  In the same vein, 
environmental agenda aims to impose higher standards in developing countries, which may 
compromise their development objectives.  Finally, even when it comes to factor mobility, the push 
is being made for freer flow of investment in which, as net recipients of capital, developing 
countries will give market access to investment from developed countries.  Developed country 
governments or multilateral agencies including the World Bank have not even mentioned the issue 
of labor mobility, which will require developed countries to yield market access to developing 
countries. 
  A recent statement, co-sponsored by Jagdish Bhagwati, others and myself and signed by 
many prominent Third World intellectuals and NGOs, offers a persuasive case against linkage 
between market access and labor standards.  Rather than repeat the arguments here, I reproduce the 
statement in its entirety as an appendix to this paper.  The key conclusion of the statement is that the 
WTO is best suited to achieving and maintaining open markets around the world.  By using this 
institution to also achieve social objectives, we risk openness of markets without promoting the 
social agenda in the desired way.  Therefore, it is best to leave the WTO alone to achieve open 
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Organization (ILO), as agreed in principle in the Singapore Ministerial Declaration. 
The issue of linkage is one on which there are few differences among developing countries.  
It is also an area in which economic analysis overwhelmingly supports their position.
25  Therefore, it 
offers fertile ground for them to come together and lobby for the inclusion of a clear statement 
against linkage in the Seattle Declaration. 
9. Anti-dumping 
WTO rules allow countries to act unilaterally to restrict imports by imposing antidumping 
duties if imports are priced below “normal value” and they cause or threaten material injury to the 
domestic industry. With the hands of WTO members increasingly tied with respect to conventional 
instruments of protection such as tariffs and quotas, the use of antidumping measures has 
intensified. Most ominously, some developing countries have themselves emerged as heavy users of 
this pernicious instrument. 
Prior to 1990, four developed countries initiated most of the anti-dumping cases: U.S.A., 
EC, Canada and Australia.  For instance, these countries accounted for 80% of the cases initiated 
between 1 July 1985 to 30 June 1992.  The pattern began to shift during 1990s with the result that 
between 1987 to 1996, of the approximately 2000 anti-dumping cases, these four countries and New 
Zealand accounted for 70 percent cases.  In the post-Uruguay Round era, developing countries 
rapidly emerged as intensive users of this predatory instrument.  Since 1995, developing countries 
                                                 
25 This is not to suggest that economists speak with a single voice on this issue.  Rodrik (1997), who offers 
the most effective defense of the contrary position, argues that having outlawed child labor in their own 
territory, developed countries should have the right to refuse goods produced by child labor elsewhere.  He 
also sees linkage favorably on the ground that freer trade with developing countries adversely affects the 
fortunes of unskilled workers in developed countries. 
  50 have accounted for almost two thirds of anti-dumping measures taken worldwide.  Developing 
countries engaged in anti-dumping include Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Korea, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, Thailand, Turkey and Venezuela.  As of mid 1997, there 
were 842 anti-dumping measures in force.  The United States accounted for 307 of these measures, 
EU for 157 and developing countries for 200.
26 
From the perspective of the developing countries, several concerns remain.   First, the 
proliferation of anti-dumping in developing countries themselves is a bad omen.  It threatens to 
reverse recent trade liberalization and the efficiency gains associated with it.  Sometimes, anti-
dumping duties have been so high as to effectively substitute for tariffs that were removed.  
Additionally, a majority of the anti-dumping measures by developing countries have been taken 
against other developing countries.  This hurts developing countries as targets of the measures as 
well. 
Second, developing countries bear a disproportionate burden of anti-dumping measures.   
According to the 1997 WTO Annual Report, out of a total of 239 cases initiated in 1997, 143 were 
targeted at developing countries.  A key source of fear for developing countries is that the phase out 
of MFA restrictions and prohibition on the use of voluntary export restraints may lead to a further 
intensification of anti-dumping actions against developing country exports.  There have already 
developments that give substance to these fears.  Thus, recently, EU brought an anti-dumping case 
against imports from India of a product still subject to an MFA quota.  Common sense would tell 
that a product subject to an effective and binding quota cannot be "dumped".  But this did not rule 
out a dumping charge under the technical definition of GATT.  Similarly, in steel industry, which 
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  51 has often been protected by voluntary export restraints in the past, has been subject to anti-dumping 
actions recently. 
Third, the sunset clause in the ADM Code may itself be used to legitimize anti-dumping 
duties for five years even though the industry has recovered from the injury, which led to the duties.  
Anti-dumping petitioners can conceivably misuse the five-year rule.  The rule may essentially 
rationalize the continuation of duties for five years even if the injury has in fact diminished.  
Fourth, complexities of the system and the cost of compliance with antidumping 
investigation proceedings mean that small and medium firms in the developing countries have 
difficulties defending their interests. Developing country governments can provide at best limited 
assistance to these firms. This observation is consistent with a larger share of cases resulting in 
prosecution for developing country firms than for industrial country firms. 
Finally, the issue of anti-circumvention measures, which had been left unresolved in the 
Uruguay Round, needs to be resolved. Circumvention occurs when the firms subject to 
antidumping duties bring components rather than the final product into the importing country 
and assemble the final product there.  Alternatively, the same firms may take the components to 
a third country, assemble them there, and then export to the country where they face antidumping 
duties on direct exports from their home countries. The Ministerial Declaration concluding the 
Uruguay Round recognized that the matter had not been successfully addressed and relegated it 
to the Committee on Antidumping Practices. 
Given the high degree of global integration and the number of multinationals operating 
simultaneously in many countries, determining the origin of a good is often difficult. Thus the 
potential reach of anti-circumvention measures is deep. This kind of unilateral action should be 
subject to WTO discipline, with appropriate surveillance by the WTO dispute settlement body. 
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countries. The proliferation of anti-dumping in developing countries itself has uncertain 
implications for eventual containment of anti-dumping measures.  To the extent that these 
actions are taken against developed country firms, the latter may lobby in favor of such 
containment.  At the same time, these actions undermine the ability of developing countries to 
restrain anti-dumping as an instrument.  Developing country firms that profit from anti-dumping 
actions are likely to join hands with their developed country counterparts in opposing restraints 
on anti-dumping under the auspices of WTO. 
10. Conclusions 
  In this paper, I have argued that, given their general lack of preparedness for negotiations, 
developing countries should opt for a minimalist agenda for the Seattle Round that includes the UR 
built-in agenda and industrial tariffs.    This approach also makes strategic sense since the subjects 
that go beyond trade liberalization have been put on the table by developed countries and essentially 
involve concessions to them from developing countries.  From a long-run perspective, I have argued 
that developing countries must invest substantial human and financial resources of their own in the 
development of expertise related to the WTO.  Research expertise is needed to understand the new 
issues that will continuously be put on the agenda by developed countries; negotiating expertise is 
needed to maximize the gains from future negotiations; and legal expertise is needed to defend the 
countries’ interests at the WTO dispute settlement. 
  It is in the interest of developing countries to include industrial tariffs into the agenda even 
though they are not a part of the mandate in the UR built-in agenda.  This is an area in which 
developing countries have had some negotiating experience.  Moreover, trade liberalization is a 
stated goal of many developing countries.  In the negotiating context, they can even expand their 
  53 access to developed country markets in textiles and clothing, leather and fisheries while pursuing 
their liberalization goals. 
  The UR built-in agenda requires negotiations for further liberalization in agriculture and 
services.  In both of these areas, developing countries can benefit further. With respect to 
agriculture, there are two main concerns.  First, for the countries heavily dependent on agriculture, 
adjustment costs of liberalization may be high.  Second, reductions in exports subsidies and 
domestic support in developed countries may raise the prices of food crops placing some of the 
poor, food-importing countries at risk.  The former concern can be addressed by placing the poor, 
agriculture-dependent economies on a slower track under the Special and Differential approach that 
has been an integral part of the GATT and WTO.  The latter problem will require resource transfers 
to the affected countries, especially the poor ones. 
  In the area of services, the GATS agreement still awaits completion with respect to 
subsidies, emergency safeguards and government procurement.  These are likely to remain 
contentious between developing and developed countries.  The next round must also decide upon 
the status of electronic commerce.  I have argued that it is preferable to choose a clean definition 
and have all electronic commerce classified as trade in services.  Moreover, on practical grounds, 
between cross-border and consumption abroad characterizations, the former is preferable. 
  Among the remaining items on the built-in UR agenda, the most important from the 
viewpoint of developing countries are reviews of the Agreement on TRIPs, Dispute Settlement 
process, and anti-circumvention measures in anti-dumping.  With respect to TRIPs, there is 
temptation to reopen the issue of the standards of IPRs.  My own view here is that the possibility of 
concessions by developed countries in this area are so remote that it is not worthwhile to waste 
negotiating capital on it unless it leads to some strategic advantage.  In the are of dispute settlement, 
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access to resources necessary to use the process effectively. 
  The time is not yet ripe for a multilateral agreement on investment.  From the viewpoint of 
developing countries, the only positive reason for such an agreement is that it may bring about an 
end to subsidies on direct foreign investment.  But there appears to be no constituency for such a 
change: developing countries want to continue with the subsidies to attract foreign capital while 
developed countries are happy to see their multinationals benefit from the subsidization.  Even if 
these subsidies could be capped, however, it is not clear whether the change will be sufficient to 
compensate developing countries for the market access they will grant to foreign capital.  I have 
argued that developing countries should not give such access without receiving reciprocal 
guarantees for at least limited access to developed country markets for skilled labor.  
  Finally, developing countries should reject unequivocally the demands for a linkage 
between trade policy and labor and environmental standards.  In particular, they should seek a clear 
statement at Seattle that, as agreed in the Singapore Ministerial Declaration, the issue of labor 
standards will be left to the ILO.  Trade is the wrong instrument for promoting labor and 
environmental standards. 
  55  
References 
Bhagwati, Jagdish, 1999, “Some Comments from an Economic Perspective on the Dispute 
Settlement Mechanism,” note circulated at the conference “The Next Negotiating Round: 
Examining the Agenda for Seattle,” Columbia University, July 22-23, 1999. 
 
Bhagwati, J. and R. Hudec, eds., 1996, Fair Trade and Harmonization: Prerequisites for Free 
Trade? Vol. 1, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Correa, Carlos M., 1999, “Positive Agenda for the TRIPs Agreement,” mimeo, June 9, 1999. 
 
Davey, W. J., 1999, “Improving WTO Dispute Settlement,” paper presented at the conference “The 
Next Negotiating Round: Examining the Agenda for Seattle,” Columbia University, July 22-
23, 1999. 
 
Hoekman, Bernard, and Kamal Saggi, 1999. “Multilateral Disciplines for Investment-Related 
Policies?” World Bank, mimeo 
 
Hudec, Robert, 1999, “The Agenda for the Reform of the Dispute Settlement Procedure,” paper 
presented at the conference “The Next Negotiating Round: Examining the Agenda for 
Seattle,” Columbia University, July 22-23, 1999. 
 
Ingco, Marlinda, 1995, “Agricultural Trade Liberalization in the Uruguay Round: One Step 
Forward, One Step Back?” Supplementary paper prepared for the World Bank Conference 
on the Uruguay Round and the Developing Economies. Washington, D.C.  26-27 January 
1995. 
 
Jackson, John, 1998, “Dispute Settlement and the WTO. Emerging Problems,” Journal of 
International Economic Law, 329-351. 
 
Moran, Theodore H., 1996, Foreign Direct Investment and Development: The New Policy Agenda 
for Developing Countries and Economies in Transition, Washington: Institute for 
International Economics, December 1998. 
 
Panagariya, Arvind, 1998a. “WTO and Developing Country Interests,” Economic Times, December 
14, 1998. 
 
Panagariya, Arvind, 1998b. “Dealing with Investment in WTO,” Economic Times, December 28, 
1998. 
 
Panagariya, Arvind, 1999a, “Free Trade at Border,” paper presented at the conference “The Next 
Negotiating Round: Examining the Agenda for Seattle,” Columbia University, July 22-23, 
1999. 
  56  
Panagariya, Arvind, 1999b, “TRIPs and the WTO: An Uneasy Marriage,” University of Maryland, 
mimeo. 
 
Panagariya, Arvind, 1999c, “E-Commerce, WTO and Developing Countries,” University of 
Maryland, mimeo. 
 
Ricupero, Rubens, 1998, “Integration of Developing Countries into the Multilateral Trading 
System,” in Bhagwati, J. and Hirsch, M., eds., The Uruguay Round and Beyond. Essays in 
Honour of Arthur Dunkel, Berlin: Springer-Verlag, p. 17. 
 
Rodrik, Dani, 1997, Has Globalization Gone too Far?, Washington, D.C.:  Institute for International 
Economics. 
 
Sapir, A., 1998, “The Political Economy of the EC regionalism,” European Economic Review 42, 
717-732. 
 
Subramanian, Arvind, 1990,  “TRIPs and the Paradigm of the GATT: A Tropical, Temperate 
View,” World Economy 13(4), 509-21. 
 
Subramanian, Arvind, 1994, “Putting Some Numbers on the TRIPs Pharmaceutical Debate,” in 
Two Systems of Innovation, (An independent study by the Rural Advancement Foundation 
International, New York). 
 
Tangermann, S., 1994, “An Assessment of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture,” paper 
prepared for the OECD’s Agricultural Directorate, Paris. 
 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). 1996. "Strengthening the 
Participation of Developing Countries in World Trade and the Multilateral Trading System." 
Paper presented at the ESCAP/UNCTAD/UNDP Meeting of Senior Officials. Jakarta. 4-6 
September. 
 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 1999, Preparing for Future 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations: Issues and Research Needs from a Development 
Perspective, Geneva: Palais des Nations. 
 
Zutshi, B. K., 1998, “Bringing TRIPS into the Multilateral Trading System,” in Bhagwati, J. and 
Hirsch, M., eds., The Uruguay Round and Beyond. Essays in Honour of Arthur Dunkel, 
Berlin: Springer-Verlag, p. 40. 
  57 Appendix: Third World Intellectuals and NGOsStatement Against Linkage 
(TWIN-SAL) 
1. As intellectuals (including economists, political scientists and others) and NGOs from the Third 
World, we declare our unambiguous opposition to Linkage of Labour and Environmental Standards 
to WTO and to trade treaties. We also wish to disabuse the media and the governments in the 
developed countries of the notion that those who oppose Linkage are corporate interests and malign 
governments.  
2. The demand for Linkage via a Social clause in the WTO (and corresponding preconditions on 
environmental standards for WTO-protected market access) is a reflection of the growing tendency 
to impose an essentially trade-unrelated agenda on this institution and on to other trade treaties. It is 
the result of an alliance between two key groups:  
(i)  Politically powerful lobbying groups that are "protectionist" and want to blunt the 
international competition from developing countries by raising production costs 
there and arresting investment flows to them; and  
(ii)  The morally-driven human rights and other groups that simply wish to see higher 
standards abroad and have nothing to do with protectionist agendas.  
 3. The former groups are not interested in improving the wellbeing in the developing countries; 
they are actuated by competitiveness concerns and hence are selfishly protective of their own turf. 
This is manifest, for example, in the selective nature of the contents of the proposed Social Clause: 
only issues, such as Child Labor, where the developing countries are expected to be the defendants 
rather than plaintiffs, are included. Thus, enforcement against domestic sweatshops, which is 
notoriously minuscule and lax in the United States where they abound in the textiles apparel 
  58 industry, is not in the Social Clause; nor are the rights of migrant labor which is subject to quasi-
slavery conditions in parts of US agriculture.  
Nor does the Social Clause look askance at yet other unpleasant social facts in the developed 
countries. For example, the United States has almost as little as 12% of its labor force in unions 
today. A country that insists on measuring trade openness of Japan by looking at "results" (i.e. 
actual imports), the US ought to be equally willing to treat the absence of unions in an industry as a 
prima facie presumption that there is some de facto deterrence to union formation. As it happens, 
unionization there has almost certainly been handicapped, among several factors, by legislation (on 
matters such as the right to hire replacement workers during a strike) that has impaired unions' chief 
weapon, the ability to strike.  
Nor has any developed-country proponent of the Social Clause proposed that the developed 
countries ought to take a far greater commitment to labour rights than the developing countries that 
are at a much lower stage of development. Thus, while unionization must surely be permitted in 
developing countries, should not the United States require, in the interest of genuine economic 
democracy, union representation on Boards of Directors the way some European nations do? 
Ironically, in the United States, one cannot even begin to do this in a meaningful way since unions 
are absent from most factories in the first place. Thus, in these ways, we see that the moral face of 
these developed-country lobbies agitating for higher labour and environmental standards in the 
developing countries, whether they are labor unions or corporate groups, is little more than a mask 
which hides the true face of protectionism. They stand against the trading and hence the economic 
interests of the developing countries and are in fact advancing their own economic interests; and 
they need to be exposed as such.  
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for labor and the environment in the Third World; and they must be fulsomely applauded. But their 
demands for Linkage, i.e. the inclusion of provisions for improvements in standards as 
preconditions for trade access in the WTO and other trade treaties and institutions, while not 
deceptive and self-serving, are nonetheless mistaken and must also be rejected. Superior ways of 
advancing these objectives and agendas exist, which lie outside of the trade context and can be pro-
actively pursued instead. Thus, consider:  
(i) Self-serving Selectivity: Contaminating the Moral Agenda: If we treat these standards 
from a moral viewpoint as "social" and "ethical" agendas to be advanced everywhere, we still 
confront the fact that the agendas will continue to be selected from the viewpoint of trade- 
competitiveness concerns. Therefore, they will inevitably tend to be selectively biased against the 
developing countries. They will also protect the developed countries from symmetric scrutiny of 
their own violations of non-selected social and ethical, "human rights" norms that have been 
incorporated in international agreements such as the United Nations International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, and the United Nations Covenant on the Child. This has already happened. 
What a neutral and universal approach to the use of trade sanctions requires instead is that their use 
in the case of all significant human rights norms be subjected to an agreement among nation states. 
Thus, the possibility of juvenile capital punishment in the United States, an egregious violation of 
the Covenant on the Child that offends the moral sense of nearly all civilised nations today, should 
equally be a subject for suspension of trade access to US products generally.  
If trade proscription against the United States is rejected, as we agree, on the ground that it 
cannot proscribe even the widely-condemned possibility of juvenile capital punishment because it is 
politically extremely difficult to do so, how can the inability of India and Bangladesh to effectively 
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problem, become a subject for rapid-fire proscription via the Social Clause?  
Surely, it makes sense to treat all such lapses from the human rights covenants, by every 
country, in their total economic, political and social context, advancing sophisticated and nuanced 
public policy programs that enable sustainable progress to be made on implementing the desired 
change; and this approach should be symmetrically applied to the problems endemic to the 
developed countries as much as to those afflicting primarily the developing countries. In short, the 
human-rights approach must reflect a genuine commitment to the entire slate of important human 
rights, treating the matter of sanctions impartially and symmetrically sans borders and without 
favouritism towards the rich and the powerful nations.  
We are distressed that we see no evidence that, except for a few groups such as Amnesty 
International, this symmetric approach is taken to the issue of trade sanctions. The developing 
countries, looking at the Social Clause for instance, cannot but regard it as having therefore been 
contaminated by the selectivity imposed by the rich nations.  
And this is not a matter for surprise. For, deep down, this selectivity reflects the 
competitiveness concerns that inevitably dominate trade negotiations and treaties and institutions: 
competitiveness is the name of the trade game! You cannot expect anything but hard play if you go 
to a poker game; to expect the poker players to burst into singing hymns while they drink whiskey 
and utter profanities is to be naive.  
(ii) You Cannot Kill Two Birds with One Stone: By thus contaminating and devaluing the 
moral objectives, even though the subset of groups advancing them have truly a moral rather than a 
disguised competitiveness objective, we wind up harming both trade liberalization (which is the true 
objective of the WTO) and advancement of the social and moral agendas. Thus, the proponents of 
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them and developed countries end up with internal division. In the United States, we have 
Democrats who want to go after the developing countries on their standards even more vigorously 
than the Clinton administration and many Republicans who instead oppose Linkage altogether. Not 
surprisingly, the Clinton administration failed to get fast-track authority for trade liberalization 
renewed for the first time in US history last year.  
At the same time, the advancement of the social and moral agendas gets held up because it 
is being pursued (under protectionist pressures) in an evidently cynical and self-servingly selective 
fashion by the developed countries that push for it, mainly the United States and France.  
So, we undermine both of these important tasks that we, as progressive intellectuals and 
NGOs in the Third World would like to see advanced. The underlying reason for such an 
unsatisfactory outcome is that you are trying to kill two birds with one stone. Generally, you cannot. 
So, trying to implement two objectives, the freeing of trade and advancing social and moral 
agendas, through one policy instrument such as WTO, you will undermine both. You will miss both 
birds.  
(iii) Our Proposal: Get Another Stone: This leads to our main proposal: Linkage is like 
trying to kill two birds with one stone, so we need another stone or a whole slew of sharp pellets. 
That stone has to be a pro-active set of agendas, at appropriate international agencies such as the 
ILO, UNICEF and UNEP; moral and financial support for NGOs in the developing countries; and 
so on. The opponents of this idea argue that the ILO, for instance, lacks teeth. But the teeth fell out 
because the ILO was sidelined when the United States had pulled out of it. Today, if we are serious, 
we can open ILO's mouth and give it a new set of teeth.  
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Review Mechanism (TPRM), to bring out annual Review Reports on member countries' conformity 
to the ILO conventions; UNICEF could do the same for Children's Covenant; UNEP for 
Environmental Standards, and so on. Appropriate agencies putting out such impartial reviews would 
enable numerous NGOs to build their crusades on impartial analyses that are truly symmetric just 
the way the WTO has managed with the TPRM. Do not underestimate the value of information and 
exposure as long as it is impartial between nations. The Dracula Effect --- expose evil to sunlight 
and it will shrivel up and die --- can be very potent indeed.  
 5. Therefore, we urge that Linkage be buried. It should be replaced by Appropriate Governance at 
the international level, where each agenda is pursued efficiently in appropriate agencies. This does 
not mean that there are no necessary interfaces. This is especially true between UNEP and WTO to 
address inherently overlapping problems: e.g. the solution to conflicts between trade-sanction 
provisions in MEAs and WTO obligations, and the “values”-related unilateralism on sanctions that 
led to the contentious Dolphin-tuna and Shrimp-turtle cases. It is important to remember, at the 
same time, that these interfaces can be addressed often by imaginative solutions that can be pursued 
without sacrificing either trade or the environment.  
In lieu of the confrontations that have become common now between groups pushing for 
trade and those pushing for the social agendas, it is time at Seattle that we banish the Linkage issue 
from the WTO agenda. Instead, we must devote all energies to these "necessary-interface" questions 
with goodwill and creative solutions.  
 6. If the developed countries' governments, intellectuals and NGOs are allowed to do otherwise, the 
Third World will have to bear the burden. This is evident from what happened to the successful 
crusade to get Intellectual Property Protection (IPP) into the WTO.  
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basic attribute of free trade: that each member benefits since trade liberalization is a mutual-gain 
policy. By contrast, the WTO Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights or TRIPs Agreement, 
which enshrines IPP into the WTO, essentially redistributes income from the developing to the 
developed countries. We cannot even claim that the TRIPs Agreement advances the world good: 
nearly all economists agree, for instance, that the 20-year Patent length, which was built into the 
TRIPs Agreement, is almost certainly inefficient and exploitative of the vast majority of the 
developing-country nations. But it got into the WTO, as part of the Uruguay Round agreement, 
simply because it was backed by developed-country power as reflected in Special 301 retaliations 
by the United States, and also because of endless repetition in the public arena-despite economic 
logic to the contrary-that it was good also for the developing countries (an assertion in which the 
World Bank economics leadership joined, evidently under the shadow of Washington). The 
intellectual objections of Third World economists, the negotiating objections of some of their 
governments, were simply brushed aside. The same is likely to happen on Linkage unless the Third 
World unites and is vociferous. This time, the NGOs of the developed countries, like the developed-
country corporate lobbies under IPP, are into the game instead. In fact, they now argue that, having 
delivered IPP to Corporations, the WTO must now give Linkage to Labor and for Nature. So, 
having been successfully harmed once, we are to be harmed again for equity among the lobbies of 
the developed countries. The NGOs pushing for Linkage need to be reminded that IPP was pushed 
into the WTO, not for corporations everywhere, but for their corporations!  
 7. It is time to raise our voices and call a spade a spade. The WTO's design must reflect the 
principle of mutual-gain; it cannot be allowed to become the institution that becomes a prisoner of 
every developed-country lobby or group that seeks to advance its agenda at the expense of the 
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interests through successive enlargement of the issues at the WTO by simply claiming, without any 
underlying and coherent rationale, that the issue is "trade-related", has gone too far already. It is 
time for us to say forcefully: Enough is enough.  
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Table 1. Post-UR Tariff Rates: United States 
 
Products  Proportion of Imports Subject to Tariff Rates 
 
Average 
Tariff  Duty Free  0.1-5.0  5.1-10.0  10.1-15.0  15.1-35.0  Over 35 
   
Total 3.50 39.50 42.90 10.20 1.30 6.00 0.10
Fish and Fish Products 
 
1.20  87.50  1.90  4.00  6.40  0.20  0.00 
Wood  Products 0.50 89.50 5.60 4.80 0.10 0.00 0.00
Textiles and Clothing  14.60  4.90  9.20  25.90  8.00  52.00  0.00 
Leather, Rubber, Footwear 
 
7.10  12.70  33.20  47.30  2.90  1.50  2.40 
Metals 1.50 59.70 30.80 8.90 0.60 0.00 0.00
Chemicals and Photographic 
Supplies 
2.80 31.50 49.10 19.40 0.00 0.00 0.00
Transport  Equipment 3.50 8.70 85.20 0.30 0.70 5.10 0.00
Non-electric  Machinery
 
1.00 62.80 35.00 2.20 0.00 0.00 0.00
Electric  Machinery 2.00 35.90 61.10 2.80 0.20 0.00 0.00
Minerals and Precious Stones  2.50  59.80  14.30  23.50  1.30  1.10  0.00 
Other Manufactured Articles'  1.50  59.40  31.30  8.80  0.40  0.10  0.00 
         
               
             
             
             
               
               
             
 
Source: UNCTAD (1996) 
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Table 2. Post-UR Tariff Rates: European Union 
Product  Proportion of Imports Subject to Tariff Rates 
 
Average 
Tariff  Duty Free  0.1-5.0  5.1-10.0  10.1-15.0  15.1-35.0  Over 35 
   
Total 3.60 37.70 34.20 19.00 8.20 0.90 0.00
Fish and Fish Products 
 
10.20  6.90  14.50  29.60  31.20  17.80  0.00 
Wood  Products 0.70 88.50 3.00 8.50 0.00 0.0 0.00
Textiles and Clothing  9.10  1.30  19.10  25.50  54.10  0.00  0.00 
Leather, Rubber, Footwear 
 
5.1  24.50  40.70  23.00  0.00  11.80  0.00 
Metals 1.10 73.70 19.60 6.70 0.00 0.00 0.00
Chemicals and Photographic Supplies 
 
4.50  27.20  4.00  68.80  0.00  0.00  0.00 
Transport  Equipment 6.50 23.40 15.70 59.90 0.80 0.20 0.00
Non-electric  Machinery
 
1.40 33.90 63.10 3.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Electric  Machinery 5.20 3.90 69.90 8.30 17.90 0.00 10
Minerals and Precious Stones  0.60  85.20  10.40  3.30  1.10  0.00  0.00 
Other Manufactured Articles  3.50  24.20  58.90  12.00  4.30  0.60  0.00 
         
               
             
             
             
               
             
 
Source: UNCTAD (1996) 
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Table 3. Post-UR Tariff Rates: Japan 
Product  Proportion of Imports Subject to Tariff Rates 
 
Average 
Tariff  Duty Free  0.1-5.0  5.1-10.0  10.1-15.0  15.1-35.0  Over 35 
   
Total 1.70 71.00 16.60 9.70 2.00 0.70 0.00
Fish and Fish Products 
 
4.00  1.90  70.70  25.70  1.70  0.00  0.00 
Wood  Products 0.70 89.20 4.30 6.50 0.00 0.00 0.00
Textiles and Clothing  7.60  4.50  19.10  54.70  21.50  0.20  0.00 
Leather, Rubber, Footwear 
 
8.30  40.60  0.90  34.00  2.90  21.5  0.10 
Metals 0.50 84.20 14.00 1.80 0.00 0.00 0.00
Chemicals and Photographic 
Supplies 
1.90 47.20 49.70 3.10 0.00 0.00 0.00
Transport  Equipment 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Non-electric  Machinery
 
0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Electric  Machinery 0.10 97.30 2.70 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Minerals  and  Precious  Stones 0.20 94.50 3.10 2.40 0.00 0.00 0.00
Other  Manufactured  Articles 0.60 86.90 9.10 4.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
         
               
             
             
             
               
               
             
               
               
 
Source: UNCTAD (1996) 
 
 
  68 Table 4: Uruguay Round Tariff Bindings and Actual Tariff Equivalents of Agricultural 
Protection, 1986-2000 
Product Actual  Tariff 
Equivalent 
(percent) 
1989-1993 
Tariff Binding 
(percent) 
Final Period 
2000 
Proportional 
Reduction by 
2000 
Dirty 
Tariffication
a 
1986-1988 
Binding 
2000/Actual 
Tariff 
Equivalent 
1989-1993 
          
European Union           
Wheat 68  109  36  1.60  1.60 
Coarse Grains  89  121  36  1.42  1.36 
Rice 103  231  36  2.36  2.24 
Beef and Veal  97  87  10  1.00  0.90 
Other Meat  27  34  36  1.32  1.26 
Dairy Products  147  205  29  1.63  1.39 
Sugar 144  279  6  1.27  1.94 
All Agriculture           
Unweighted Average  45  73    1.61  1.63 
Standard Deviation  57  96    1.58  1.68 
          
United States           
Wheat 20  4  36  0.30  0.20 
Coarse Grains  2  2  74  2.00  1.00 
Rice 2  3  36  5.00  1.50 
Beef and Veal  2  26  15  10.33  13.00 
Other Meat  I  3  36  0.67  3.00 
Dairy Products  46  93  15  1.09  2.02 
Sugar 67  91  15  1.50  1.36 
All Agriculture           
Unweighted Average  13  23    1.44  1.77 
Standard Deviation  22  35    1.20  1.59 
 
a: Announced base tariff rate as a ratio of actual tariff equivalent in the base period. 
 
Source: Ingco (1995) 
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Table 5: Unweighted Average Percentage Post-UR Tariffs in Agriculture: APEC 
Members 
Country Austr-
alia 
Canada Indo-
nesia 
Japan Korea Mexico  Malay-
sia 
New 
Zealand 
Phili-
ppines 
Singa-
pore 
Product              
Paddy  rice  1.0 0.0 9.0 444.0  49.0  8.0 49.0  1.0  49.0  2.2 
Wheat  0.0 26.0  0.0 193.0  13.0  0.0 13.0  0.0  13.0  2.7 
Grains  0.0 24.0  6.0 180.0  95.0  0.0 95.0  0.0  95.0  5.3 
Non-grain  crops  3.3 3.0 38.3  38.7  47.7  3.0 47.7  3.3  47.7  7.5 
Processed  rice 0.0 7.0 0.0 36.5  41.0  0.0 41.0  0.0  41.0  3.9 
Meat  0.5  26.0 10.7 193.0  32.5 19.5 13.0 0.5  13.0 3.1 
Milk  7.0 157.0  0.0 207.0  111.0  4.0 111.0  7.0  111.0  4.2 
Other  food    0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0  0.0 6.1 
 
Source: The Pacific Economic Cooperation Council for APEC, 1995, Survey of 
Impediments to Trade and Investment in the APEC Region. 
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